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We analyze the main forces affecting financial system pro-cyclicality (the fact that developments in the 
financial sector can amplify business cycle fluctuations). We first review some major structural 
developments in financial markets that may influence pro-cyclicality and that have been overlooked in 
earlier analyses. We then examine three issues that are center stage in the current debate: capital regulation, 
accounting standards and managers’ incentives. After reviewing the institutional set-up and the key 
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Executive summary 
The idea that the financial sector can amplify the business cycle (the concept of pro-cyclicality 
adopted here) dates back at least to Irving Fisher (1933). In this original view, however, financial 
factors have an asymmetric role: financial frictions limit the availability of external finance to firms 
and households, worsening downturns; however, they do not have a symmetric positive role during 
upturns. The modern financial accelerator (FA) theory removes this asymmetry. The FA works 
mainly through the value of collateral: a rise in asset prices makes it easier for households and firms 
to obtain loans, while a decline makes it more difficult. This mechanism is pro-cyclical because 
asset prices tend to be positively correlated with the business cycle, and because credit availability 
feeds back onto investment and consumption, and hence onto economic growth. 
A similar mechanism affects banks’ balance sheets: a negative shock to asset prices depletes 
capital and increases leverage. Since raising new capital is difficult in a downturn, banks tend to 
react by reducing assets. Disposals feed back onto asset prices, propagating the initial shock. This 
may have a strong impact on economic activity, especially when shocks hit several banks 
simultaneously, as is typical of systemic events. In this framework, which we refer to as the New 
Financial Accelerator (NFA), the propagating factor is leverage: when banks are highly leveraged, 
the initial shock and the ensuing reduction in asset prices will induce massive asset liquidations, 
accentuating the price fall and possibly triggering a vicious circle, especially if banks want to 
restore a target leverage level (see Section 1). In principle, the mechanism is symmetric: a positive 
shock increases capital and reduces leverage, inducing banks to expand assets. We look at the 
relationship between leverage and asset prices in the main industrial countries, and find that NFA-
type mechanisms may be at work, but that the evidence is not clear cut.   
Section 2 briefly reviews financial liberalization, technological and financial innovation, and 
their effects on the financial system: an increase in securitization, fostering the originate-to-
distribute model of intermediation; a shift from relationship to arm’s length banking; an increase in 
the level of banking competition; the development of credit scoring and remote banking; 
international financial integration; and greater household exposure to financial risk. We discuss how 
these changes may have affected the pro-cyclicality of the financial system.  
In theory, pro-cyclicality would not emerge if banks held sufficient capital buffers through the 
cycle, improving their capital position in upturns in order to withstand losses in downturns. 
Analyses of this issue should therefore recognize the trade-off between the effects of pro-cyclicality 
of banks’ balance sheets on the one hand and the cost of holding capital on the other. 
Acknowledging this trade-off, we examine how pro-cyclicality can be mitigated and the need for 
additional capital be contained. We focus on capital regulation, accounting standards and managers’ 
incentives. This choice leaves out important issues, more or less closely intertwined with that of 
pro-cyclicality: the causes of the crisis; the shortcomings of macroeconomic policies; the features of 
supervisory frameworks; the role of credit rating agencies. We refer to de Larosière et al. (2009), 
Volcker et al. (2009), and Acharya and Richardson (2009) for a discussion of these issues and a 
focus on reforms to improve financial stability. Also, see Financial Stability Forum (2009) for a 
series of recommendations to reduce financial sector pro-cyclicality, many of which are also 
discussed in the present paper.  
Capital Regulation 
Section 3 reviews the link between risk-based capital regulation and pro-cyclicality. We 
emphasize the following points. First, Basel II strengthens the link between banks’ regulatory 
capital and the risk of assets, and thus is inherently pro-cyclical; this reflects the fact that while risk 
accumulation proceeds during expansions, risk materializes in downturns (Borio et al. 2001). 
Second, Basel II does contain safeguards against pro-cyclicality; for example banks are encouraged   6
to use smoothed estimates of the inputs of the capital function (the formula linking asset risk to 
capital requirements), so as to limit cyclical variations. However, the evidence suggests that the 
implementation did not fully conform to the regulation’s spirit. This reflects several factors, 
including a set of incentives that may prompt banks to adopt more cyclical estimates so as to 
maximize profits. Third, risk-based capital regulation that only refers to individual banks 
underestimates systemic risk by neglecting the macro impact of banks reacting in unison to a shock 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2009).  
Several measures have been proposed to mitigate the pro-cyclicality of risk-based regulation. 
Most of these measures may well set off a search for ways to circumvent them. All rules require 
further harmonization of accounting standards and of the criteria for consolidation, in order to avoid 
elusion via off balance sheet items and ensure uniform implementation across countries. 
Measures addressing micro-economic risks 
Adjusting for expected losses – Accounting standards as applied in most countries only 
recognise loan losses after a specific loss event occurs (see below); because defaults increase in 
downturns, this induces pro-cyclicality. In order to counter this effect, statistical provisioning for 
expected losses could be introduced. Banks could be required to adopt a simple rule, linking loss 
provisions to a measure of the outstanding value (or expansion) of their credit. This “dynamic 
provisioning” rule would take into account the observed correlation between credit booms and 
loosening credit standards, and would be relatively simple to apply. A version has been in use in 
Spain for some time. Critics have suggested that it does not take into account large losses which 
may occur with small probability; however, this objection overlooks the fact that the rule would 
complement, not replace, other capital rules which ensure against low probability or even systemic 
events (see below). Another objection is that it could penalize banks with high loan growth, which 
might be the most efficient ones. Its conformity with existing accounting standards (IAS/IFRS) has 
also been questioned.  
We propose an alternative, slightly different approach which would require banks – for 
supervisory purposes – to consider credit value adjustments (CVA) during upturns in order to 
provision for the likely losses in the ensuing downturn. This mechanism would be similar to that 
already used for market risk in Basel II; it would share the main advantages and disadvantages of 
dynamic provisioning but would not interfere with the IAS/IFRS framework as it would not affect 
the profit and loss account.  
Adjusting for unexpected losses – In the Basel II framework capital requirements aim to insure 
against large and rare (i.e. unexpected) losses. The capital function could be modified in order to 
smooth capital requirements through the cycle. One possibility would be to smooth the inputs (i.e. 
the parameters needed to quantify risk), for example by using conservative estimates in expansions 
in order to reduce adjustments in downturns. Alternatively, one could smooth the function’s output 
(i.e. the amount of capital for given risk). These solutions would be relatively easy to implement, 
but their effects could be partially undone by banks’ choices of parameters and risk models.  
Limits on banks’ leverage ratio  
Risk-based capital requirements could be supplemented by a ceiling on banks’ leverage ratio, 
computed on the basis on non-risk-weighted assets. This ceiling, which various countries have 
already adopted, can be considered an insurance against the failure of the complex models used to 
assess credit risk and compute capital requirements. In spite of its conceptual simplicity, the 
implementation of a ceiling would imply addressing a number of technical issues concerning the 
appropriate concept of leverage and its calculation.    7
In our view, simple rules of this nature – based on quantitative limits on risk – could represent 
a useful tool for other risks as well. For example, the crisis has pointed out the importance of 
liquidity risk. Innovative ways of measuring this risk and translating it into capital requirements 
have been proposed. However, as with credit risk, given its systemic nature and the externalities it 
involves, liquidity risk may be difficult to identify, hard to measure and costly to insure. Due 
consideration should be given to simple, readily enforceable rules to cap banks’ liquidity risk. 
Solutions worth examining in depth are: constraining maturity mismatches; imposing buffers of 
liquid assets proportional to the share of illiquid ones; imposing supervisory provisions on new 
financial instruments, which could decline over time, as information about the instruments and their 
risk improves. 
Measures taking into account systemic factors  
The foregoing proposals would attenuate pro-cyclicality at the level of single banks, but they 
might still leave the system vulnerable at the macro level. This issue is addressed by proposals to 
adjust capital requirements in response to signals of macro instability. 
Linking capital requirements to macro risk – Capital requirements could be linked to system-
wide measures of credit expansion or risk (e.g. aggregate lending growth), or to a wider set of 
indicators (e.g. system-wide leverage, liquidity risk, asset price dynamics). Application of this rule 
would require addressing a series of practical difficulties (e.g. which macro variable(s) to consider 
and how to combine them, especially for cross-border banks).  
An alternative proposal focuses on systemically relevant institutions, tying equity to the 
probability of spillover risk (the risk that problems at one or few institutions may cause systemic 
instability). This probability could be measured using sophisticated statistical techniques, on the 
basis of such variables as leverage, maturity mismatch, credit and asset price expansion. The 
regulation should not be restricted to banks alone but should extend to all financial institutions that 
could generate systemic risk. As argued by the authors, this proposal is in many respects similar to 
dynamic provisioning and as such it shares many of its virtues and caveats. Its higher level of 
sophistication makes it possible to take into account the complex interaction between lending 
standards, credit growth and other relevant variables, as well as the potential instability arising from 
large and complex financial institutions (due e.g. to size or interconnections). But the complexity of 
the proposal may also be seen as a weakness, as its implementation, and supervision, could be 
difficult. One may wonder whether the same objective could be achieved via simpler criteria, based 
primarily on the size of intermediaries.  
Capital insurance – An insurance-like approach to systemic risk could be considered. By 
recognizing that tail risk (the risk of rare events with incalculable costs) is a serious issue but that 
holding worst-case levels of capital at all times would be inefficient, a number of proposals 
advocate what amounts to contingent claims that turn into equity when needed. Our view is that 
“systemic” reverse convertible-type securities may provide a viable solution: banks could issue 
bonds that convert into equity given a trigger event, defined by some industry-wide indicator to 
avoid moral hazard. These instruments would provide capital when needed and could be traded, 
which would lower transaction costs and allow price formation. On the other hand, the fact that 
systemic risk is non-diversifiable by definition might make these instruments expensive.  
Accounting Standards 
In recent years listed  firms, and in some countries the entire banking sector, have been 
adopting the new accounting standards drafted by the two main worldwide accounting bodies, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the United States Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB). The principal change brought about by the new regulation is the move   8
from Historical Cost Accounting (HCA) to Fair Value Accounting (FVA). The new system defines 
fair value as the amount for which an instrument “could be exchanged between knowledgeable, 
willing parties in an arm’s length transaction”. For actively traded assets, this is the market price 
(mark-to-market accounting); in the absence of a quoted price, estimation techniques must be used 
(mark-to-model accounting). The rules promoted by the IASB, known as IAS/IFRS, are now used 
by more than a hundred countries. The share of bank assets at fair value differs from country to 
country, ranging between 30% and 50% in the most advanced; it is typically larger for systemically 
relevant institutions.  
According to the literature, the choice between FVA and HCA involves a trade-off: FVA 
provides timely information and improves transparency but brings excessive volatility to banks’ 
balance sheets; HCA neglects timeliness but minimizes volatility. In Section 4 we depart somewhat 
from this consensus, arguing that some form of FVA (e.g. a time series average of point-in-time 
fair-value estimates) strictly dominates HCA in all cases. 
Our review of the debate on accounting and pro-cyclicality suggests several conclusions. First, 
the new accounting standards affect banks’ investment choices and managers’ incentives pro-
cyclically. The key issue is that FVA immediately transposes asset price changes into balance 
sheets, whether the gains or losses have been realized or not. Since asset prices are pro-cyclical, the 
expansion of balance sheets during booms (and their contraction in downturns) is sharper than 
under HCA. This effect is magnified further if banks target a given level of leverage. Second, the 
role of FVA should not be overemphasized: business practices based on mark-to-market – such as 
stop-loss strategies, margin calls or Value at Risk models for risk management – were widespread 
well before FVA was introduced. Third, although a number of the factors affecting pro-cyclicality 
pre-date FVA, their effects can be mitigated by amending accounting rules.  
There is an ample debate on possible actions to mitigate the pro-cyclical bias of FVA. The 
main organizations involved – in particular the FSF and accounting bodies – are working on 
proposals. Here we focus on the main issues emerging from our review in Section 4.  
Discretionality should be reduced – At times, the new accounting standards proved to be 
complex and subject to various interpretations, to the detriment of comparability of accounts. This 
heightened uncertainty and reduced market liquidity, aggravating the crisis. The accounting bodies 
are working to clarify the specific definitions (e.g. “active market”, “distress sale”, or “other than 
temporary” impairment), which play a non-trivial role in the implementation of FVA.  
Broader issues are harder to address. One example is the principle of valuation according to 
holding intention, introduced by the new accounting standards: for example, an instrument must be 
marked to market if managers intend to sell it in the short term but can be valued at cost if the 
intention is to hold it to maturity. This mechanism has been questioned because of the discretion it 
leaves to each bank in valuing the same product. Valuation based on the instruments’ nature could 
limit discretion but would not eliminate it and would sever the link between valuation and the role 
of assets/liabilities in the balance sheet, which was a key motivation for the adoption of the new 
accounting standards. Another area in which convergence on methodologies is essential but may be 
hard to achieve is valuation of illiquid/complex instruments.  
Excessive use of FVA should be avoided – The crisis has shown that assets not intended for 
immediate sale were often nonetheless included in the trading portfolio and booked at fair value 
instead of amortized cost, possibly in order to exploit potential short-term valuation gains. The 
treatment of “ineffective hedges” (trades in which the hedge does not fully cover the underlying 
risk) had similar effects: banks often chose to value all risks of the hedged asset at FV, resorting to 
estimation techniques. These valuation choices inflated the share of assets booked at FV, 
magnifying the perverse interaction between asset prices and balance sheets. To avoid excessive 
recourse to FVA in the future, the securities that can be included in the trading portfolio should be   9
rigorously defined (as by fixing a maximum holding period). Uniform and simplified accounting 
treatment of FV hedges might be introduced as well. 
Prudential reserves should be compatible with accounting rules – The practice of building up 
generic reserves is no longer permitted under IAS/IFRS: e.g. loan loss provisions cannot be booked 
unless impairment losses are actually incurred. However, the realization that risks tend to build up 
undetected during expansions and then to materialize in downturns is prompting proposals to 
(re)introduce forms of forward-looking provisions and reserves, which should work as automatic 
stabilizers and reduce pro-cyclicality. The credit valuation adjustment approach discussed above 
may represent a solution compatible with the accounting framework. Valuation adjustments for 
products that are marked-to-model and for illiquid instruments in general could also be considered. 
These reserves would not show up officially in the accounts but would matter for the determination 
of regulatory capital (via a regulatory capital reduction) and could be subject to disclosure 
principles.  
Amortization of goodwill – Under HCA, the bidder in a merger could write the value of 
goodwill among assets and amortize it over many years. Under IAS/IFRS goodwill is treated as an 
indefinite-life asset and is no longer amortized. But it is subject to annual impairment tests. In the 
presence of negative shocks, impairment tests generate losses that directly affect both the profit and 
loss account and the balance sheet. The treatment of goodwill under IAS/IFRS is pro-cyclical 
because M&As are also pro-cyclical; these problems could be eased by reintroducing some degree 
of amortization. 
Convergence in accounting rules should be speeded up – While similar in many respects, the 
two main accounting systems (GAAP for the U.S. and IAS/IFRS for the rest of the world) still have 
non-trivial differences. Convergence on truly global accounting standards should be speeded up, to 
ease comparisons and transparency and avoid regulatory arbitrage. 
We also examine factors affecting pro-cyclicality that pre-date the adoption of the new 
accounting standards but whose effects can be mitigated by amending accounting rules. First, the 
accounting treatment of off-balance-sheet items, which is crucial in computing leverage, should be 
tightened in order to reduce discretionality. Second, the IASB is examining a proposal to 
reintroduce the upfront recognition of profits even when prices are based on unobservable inputs, as 
in the case of Level 3 assets (complex products that are typically priced by model). This would 
strengthen the incentive to create such products, in order to sell them at prices higher than the 
model-based valuation and book upfront profits. A possible solution might be the amortization of 
day-one profits over a longer term. Third, while FVA improves the accounting treatment of risk, 
certain risks – especially liquidity risk – are often underestimated in market prices, and this affects 
valuations. The accounting bodies are working to define uniform valuation methodologies for 
illiquid assets. Liquidity premia could be estimated taking into account the holding period of each 
instrument and banks’ ability to keep the asset. This aspect, closely related to funding liquidity, has 
been largely overlooked by accountants and regulators alike.  
A controversial issue concerns the treatment of banks’ liabilities, which are still mostly at  
cost. This accentuates pro-cyclicality, as profits tend to increase in booms and decline in downturns 
more sharply than they would under symmetrical FVA treatment of assets and liabilities. Increasing 
the share of liabilities valued at FV would mitigate pro-cyclicality. However, one paradoxical 
consequence of this proposal is that a deterioration in a company’s creditworthiness would 
compress liabilities and thus increase profits.  
Incentives  
The separation between management and control in the modern corporation has driven a 
wedge between the interests of decision makers and those of investors. Theoretical research focused   10
on the need for incentives to align the interests of risk-averse managers with those of shareholders. 
And practice has conformed to the theory, so that the remuneration of managers commonly includes 
a variable, performance-related component.  
The crisis has shown that managers took on excessive risk and focused on short-term 
performance, at the expense of sound management and long-term results. Such conduct was 
fostered by remuneration schemes linked to short-term results (e.g. annual profits). Excessive risk-
taking induces pro-cyclicality, as risk is more easily taken in upturns and tends to aggravate 
downturns. The asymmetry of remuneration schemes (managers are paid handsomely if they make 
profits but not penalized for losses) acts as an incentive for high-risk projects even if they have 
negative expected value, since in some cases they generate profits – at least in the short run. 
In Section 5 we review the evidence: loan officers focusing on volumes tend to charge 
excessively low rates during expansions, helping to inflate property prices and to aggravate the 
subsequent downturn; high-powered incentives can entice managers to distort accounts in order to 
boost earnings; overvalued equity creates incentives for managers to support the firm’s stock price 
in the short term, helping to make a stock market boom self-sustaining and exacerbating the 
subsequent correction; incentive fees may tempt asset managers to take hidden risk in hopes of 
boosting performance, exploiting the fact that risks are difficult to assess ex ante. The substantial 
increases recorded by the variable part of executive compensations in recent years suggest that the 
importance of incentive mechanisms for pro-cyclicality has increased.  
These considerations have led to widespread recognition that incentives are one of the driving 
factors in the current crisis. A consensus has emerged on at least two basic principles: that the 
parameters to be used to determine managers’ variable remuneration should be adjusted for risk and 
that managers’ compensation should be linked to long-term profitability. 
Financial institutions have begun to move in this direction, pressed on by governments, who 
are imposing conditions for public support of the financial sector, by wide media coverage of the 
compensation issue and by mounting pressure from public opinion. Several banks and banking 
associations have revised their pay packages. Nevertheless, reforming managers’ remuneration 
schemes is a difficult task. First, risk adjustment methods are difficult to implement because risk 
remuneration is hard to disentangle, ex ante, from genuine performance. Second, measures that 
lengthen the horizon of managers’ compensation schemes reduce short-termism but at the same 
time reduce the incentive to exert effort: thus, the choice entails a trade-off. Third, the temporal 
mismatch between bonus payments and materialization of risks and losses can be very great indeed. 
Fourth, many of the firms that failed in the current crisis were following best practice standards in 
key areas such as board independence, separation of chairman and CEO positions, incentives and 
remuneration issues. Finally, experience has shown that stricter rules on managers’ remuneration 
schemes are hard to enforce and easily circumvented. In spite of these problems, mechanisms 
connecting compensation to long-term, risk-adjusted profitability, such as deferred bonuses, long-
term cash incentives, restricted stock grants, claw-back clauses and longer vesting horizons, are 
likely to become widespread in the future. 
Banks’ governance is also crucial. A thorough review of internal processes should improve 
banks’ decision-making, covering the mechanisms that set and monitor managers’ remuneration 
schemes, in order to remove conflicts of interest. Internal risk management systems must be 
reinforced, to make sure that the recommendations of the risk management apparatus cannot be 
overruled, and to improve estimates of tail risks. Risk managers could report directly to top 
management or to the board. Independent directors, compensation committees, powerful internal 
and external audits, and abundant information flows among all relevant actors should all contribute 
to a system of checks and balances that ensures internal discussion and reduce the risks in financial 
institutions’ portfolios.   11
The crisis is also likely to encourage changes in the organization of financial firms, fostering 
models that emphasize the importance of teamwork in well-organized structures over that of 
individual talents, in order to limit the excessive bargaining power of managers (clearly one of the 
main drivers of the high-powered compensation schemes).  
But market discipline has its limits. A more active role for regulators and supervisors in a 
matter such as that of remuneration, typically left to private contractual arrangements, is probably 
warranted when it comes to banks and other systemically relevant institutions, whose CEOs have 
strong incentives to invest in risky assets and, if they lose their bets, dump the loss on the taxpayer. 
Disclosure is crucial. Some supervisors are requiring banks to make the full details of managers’ 
compensation public: the fixed and variable components, the breakdown of the performance-related 
part, the benefits in case of contract termination. Some regulators are pushing the banks themselves 
to analyze the effects of compensation schemes and determine whether they encourage excessive 
risk-taking. Supervisors are also considering options to link capital requirements with the risks 
produced by unsatisfactory remuneration schemes. As with other proposals, the problem is that risk 
may be difficult to detect in advance. 
*   *   * 
A number of common, structural factors affecting pro-cyclicality indirectly have emerged 
repeatedly in our review. The first is market imperfections. Frictions in asset markets (e.g. 
illiquidity) amplify the mechanism of the financial accelerator; raise the cost of issuing capital in 
downturns, thus forcing banks to sell assets rather than increase equity; and force deep discounts on 
many financial products, feeding back immediately onto banks’ balance sheets through the new 
accounting standards.  
The second factor is incentives. Not only are incentives relevant per se, as we have seen, but 
they also interact with capital requirements and accounting rules. In upturns, high-powered 
incentive schemes based on short-term profit may discourage managers from accumulating 
sufficient capital buffers, the “air bags” of the financial system (Trichet, 2009); they may also drive 
managers to distort the interpretation of the rules or, in extreme cases, commit outright fraud.  
The third factor is financial innovation. Although it has positive effects when it completes 
markets, improves risk allocation or reduces transaction costs, financial innovation can also wreak 
havoc, as the current crisis has so well demonstrated. This is the case, for example, when new, 
complex financial instruments are designed to exploit loopholes, regulatory arbitrage or 
informational asymmetries for the benefit of some parties to the detriment of others, as was 
probably the case with some of the most opaque instruments (Draghi, 2008a). Distinguishing ex 
ante between products that mainly improve efficiency and those that mainly increase risk is no easy 
task, but regulators and market participants alike will need to assess the role of innovation.  
The combination of these factors creates a situation that, in our view, is difficult to address by 
means of separate reforms focusing on single problems. Even the best designed rules are liable to be 
circumvented over time. A “diversification principle” of regulation suggests the need for a broad 
net of norms and provisions, based on heterogeneous and complementary approaches; it also 
suggests the need for dynamic adaptation of this net to keep abreast of market forces – incentives 
and innovation, which jointly end, in time, by circumventing the rules. The costs entailed by this 
approach must be weighed against those of lagging behind market forces.    12
1.  THE (NEW) FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR: THE ROLE OF LEVERAGE 
A vast macroeconomic literature, developed over the last 20 years, has incorporated the idea 
– dating back at least to Fisher (1933) – that financial factors can be a powerful amplifier of the 
business cycle.
2 Financial markets are seen not just as reflecting the conditions of the real economy 
but as an important determinant of the level of economic activity. The essence of this mechanism – 
which is generally referred to as the financial accelerator (FA) – is the existence of frictions that 
limit external finance to firms and households. For example, a negative exogenous shock to the 
economy reduces the value of collateral and firms’ access to credit, with potential adverse effects on 
production. Studies have shown that there are several ways of explaining the FA.
3  
An equally vast literature has ascertained the empirical importance of the FA. Many works 
have studied how changes in net worth affect investment by financially constrained firms.
4 
Evidence of financing constraints has also been documented for households
5 and for the functioning 
of housing markets.
6 Most analyses have focused on the way in which financial market 
imperfections influence the business cycle indirectly, via their impact on the non-financial sector 
(firms and households). Much less work has been devoted to the direct role of financial firms in 
amplifying shocks to the real economy.
7 In section 1.1 we describe the underlying mechanism, 
which we call the New Financial Accelerator. Section 1.2 reviews features that may magnify its 
effects. Section 1.3 discusses some consolidated and some new empirical evidence on leverage at 
financial institutions. 
1.1 A two-way interaction between real and financial variables 
Several analyses prompted by the financial crisis point out that a financial accelerator 
mechanism may be at work for financial firms as well, and for banks in particular.
8 For further 
reference, we call this mechanism the New Financial Accelerator (NFA), although its functioning 
has been well known at least since Kindleberger (1978).  
The mechanism, which is complementary to the FA, works as follows.
9 Suppose a bank has 
assets worth 100, nominal liabilities equal to 90, and hence equity (net worth, i.e. assets less 
liabilities) equal to 10. Then its leverage, defined as the ratio of assets to net worth, is equal to 10. 
Suppose an exogenous shock reduces the value of assets by 5%, to 95. Then leverage almost 
doubles, to 19. Assume the bank targets some level of leverage – say 10, the pre-shock value. To 
restore this desired level the bank could issue equity or sell assets. When losses are large, however, 
                                                 
2   The seminal work in this field is Bernanke and Gertler (1989). 
3   See Bernanke et al. (1996). One group of models links the FA to fluctuations in the value of collateral assets (e.g. 
housing wealth; Iacoviello, 2005, and Iacoviello and Neri, 2008): rising prices allow financially constrained agents to 
expand borrowing and thus consumption and investment; conversely, collateral devaluations force agents to cut 
expenditure. A second group of models emphasizes how endogenous changes to firm balance sheets amplify the 
business cycle (see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997, and Bernanke et al., 1999). A third line of research directly analyzes 
banks’ contribution to real fluctuations (Christiano et al., 2007, Gerali et al., 2008, Goodfriend and McCallum, 
2007). 
4   See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and the review in Hubbard (1998). 
5   See Zeldes (1989), Jappelli and Pagano (1989), Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Carroll and Dunn (1997). 
6   Almeida et al. (2002) find that house prices are more sensitive to income shocks in countries with higher loan-to-
value ratios, so the credit multiplier has greater impact on household spending in those countries. 
7   A notable exception is the research activity carried out in the current decade at the Bank for International Settlements 
on the inherent pro-cyclicality of post-Bretton Woods financial arrangements. See Borio et al. (2001), Borio and 
White (2004) and White (2006) and references therein. 
8   See Adrian and Shin (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Caballero and Krishnamurty 
(2008). 
9   The example in the text is adapted from Adrian and Shin (2008).   13
banks tend to liquidate assets, since equity-raising tends to be sluggish and costly, especially in 
unfavorable market conditions, due to market frictions.
10 Note that, assuming constant prices, to 
restore the desired leverage value of 10 the bank will have to liquidate assets and liabilities until, in 
the new equilibrium, its balance sheet will be 50% smaller than before – an enormous effect that is 
amplified still more if the initial shock hits a sufficiently large number of intermediaries. In this 
case the simultaneous wave of asset sales will put further downward pressure on asset prices, 
generating a vicious circle.  
In this scheme, pro-cyclicality is mainly caused by a chain reaction triggered by an 
exogenous shock (for example, a fall in house prices) and amplified by the interplay between the 
shock and asset market dynamics. The propagating factor is leverage: when banks are highly 
leveraged, the initial shock and the ensuing reduction in asset prices induce massive asset 
liquidation, accentuating the price fall and possibly starting a vicious circle. In principle, the 
mechanism is symmetrical: an initial positive shock (e.g. a technological breakthrough, actual or 
expected) may lead to a broad rise in asset prices and hence to an expansion of intermediaries’ 
balance sheets, starting a positive circle.  
1.2 Features that magnify the NFA 
The NFA interacts with a number of other factors – such as accounting standards, capital 
requirements and incentives – that are not encompassed in the traditional financial accelerator and 
are discussed in the next sections. The following mechanisms may also amplify the functioning of 
the NFA and/or magnify the pro-cyclicality of the lending supply.
11 
i) Liquidity  spirals  – In declining markets, the value of collateral is eroded, putting pressure on 
the funding liquidity of intermediaries and forcing them to liquidate positions. If sellers dominate, 
market liquidity may contract significantly and the loss spiral will be magnified (this mechanism 
will also work in reverse, in reaction to positive shocks).
12 Liquidity spirals may be precipitated or 
aggravated by several non-mutually exclusive mechanisms: 
- Contractual/statutory arrangements – Many institutional investors and financial companies 
have constraints on their investment policy, often based on the ratings of assets; for example, 
pension funds tend not to invest in securities with low ratings. Because downgrades are more 
frequent during downturns (see Section 3), this may force these investors to sell in a falling 
market, adding to downward price pressure.  
- Maturity mismatches – Investors financing long-term positions with short-term liabilities expose 
themselves to the risk of a sudden liquidity freeze, which would make the rollover of debt hard 
                                                 
10   See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004, paragraph 757). Barakova and Carey (2001) show that banks 
need an average of 1.6 years to restore their capital after becoming undercapitalized. Kashyap et al. (2008) emphasize 
two frictions that contribute to this sluggishness: (i) equity issues increase the value of existing debt, thus generating 
an externality in favor of debtholders and harming existing shareholders; (ii) equity issues may signal forthcoming 
losses. They also note that under Basel II the pressure to liquidate assets is stronger in crisis periods, when risk and 
hence risk-weighted capital requirements increase. Repullo and Suarez (2004) emphasize that the market for seasoned 
offerings is plagued by informational frictions, which may entail prohibitive costs of raising new capital. 
11 Kashyap et al. (2008) emphasize credit crunch externalities, which magnify the traditional financial accelerator. If a 
bank decides to liquidate a loan, e.g. to a small firm, it generates a negative externality since it does not internalize the 
lost profits from projects that the firm will have to forgo. Note that this mechanism is at work even under normal 
circumstances, not just in situations of crisis. 
12  Market liquidity measures the ease with which an asset can be traded – the extent to which potentially large 
quantities of that asset can be sold or bought without significant impact on its market price. Funding liquidity 
measures the ease with which investors can obtain funding. See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). In monetary 
policy jargon, “liquidity” is the amount of monetary base that the central bank injects into or drains from banks’ 
settlement accounts in order to affect its operational target, typically a very short-term interbank interest rate.   14
or impossible. This may induce forced liquidation of assets. While we are not aware of 
systematic investigations of the cyclical behavior of maturity mismatches, anecdotal evidence 
clearly suggests that these mismatches played an important role in the current crisis.
13  
- Strategic behavior of large players – In times of financial stress, when markets become illiquid, 
large players may deliberately amplify asset price swings in order to put fund-strapped 
competitors under pressure,
 pushing an otherwise liquid intermediary into illiquidity.
14 
ii) Margins/haircuts – In a cyclical downturn, margin calls become frequent and haircuts 
increase; this reduces leverage, as margins and haircuts implicitly determine the maximum level of 
borrowing in collateralized transactions. The opposite happens in expansions.
15 Margin increases 
will contribute to liquidity spirals. 
iii)  Misperception of risk – Misperception of risk may be driven by non-rational behavior. 
Disaster myopia and cognitive dissonance, two well-known concepts from experimental 
psychology, help explain why investors may misestimate risk. Disaster myopia refers to the 
tendency to underestimate the likelihood of low-probability, high-loss events, resulting in excessive 
weight being placed on recent events and too little on remote ones.
16 Cognitive dissonance refers to 
the agents’ tendency to read the available information as consistent with their beliefs. These 
cognitive biases could generate pro-cyclical risk perceptions: when an economic expansion 
proceeds, the memory of past defaults fades and new information is interpreted as confirmation that 
the economy is moving along a sustainable, low risk path. Merely cyclical movements are perceived 
as part of a new long-run trend. With the downturn, this process may be suddenly reversed, as 
actual defaults and other information now belie the prevailing beliefs. Misperception conducive to 
excessive risk taking can also be driven by incentives (see Section 5). 
iv) VaR  –  The widely used Value at Risk (VaR) models are essential to determining the size and 
leverage of banks’ balance sheets. Empirically, measured risk (e.g. volatility, which directly 
influences the VaR) is low during booms and high during busts,
17 so banks expand their balance 
sheets and increase leverage during upturns and do the opposite during downturns.  
In a financial crisis, other mechanisms may also be at work. 
v)       Contagion in the interbank market – A shock to one bank may be amplified and propagated 
to others via the interbank market, generating systemic risk.
18 If the liquidity crisis deepens, bank 
failures may shrink the pool of liquidity shared within cross-border groups, creating “ponds” of 
liquidity delimited by national boundaries (in relation, for example, to international differences in 
bankruptcy law) and exacerbating the liquidity shortages at the global level. This could lead to a 
contagion of failures, with spillovers on the real sector.  
                                                 
13  See e.g. the account of the troubles of Hypo real estate in the Financial Times of 20 March 2009. 
14  See Adrian and Shin (2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005, 2009), Shleifer and Vishny (1997). On 17 July 2008 
the Wall Street Journal Europe reported rumours about traders of investment banks manipulating competitors’ stocks 
and an SEC investigation on market manipulation. In his testimony to the U.S. Congress on 6 October 2008, R. Fuld, 
former CEO of Lehman Brothers, claimed that “…a litany of destabilizing factors: rumors, … naked short attacks, … 
and strategic buyers sitting on the sidelines waiting for an assisted deal ….” led to the Lehman collapse.  
15  For instance, suppose a financial firm has 2 euros of capital. A haircut of 2% would imply that the fund could borrow 
98 euros, and reach a leverage of 50. If the haircut is lowered to 1% the fund could borrow up to 198 euros thus 
increasing leverage to 100. For an extensive discussion of this issue and evidence that margin calls/haircuts increase 
in times of financial stress, see Pedersen (2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Brunnermeier et al., (2009). 
16  See Guttentag and Herring (1984) for an application to credit markets. See Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001) for 
additional references on the subject. 
17  See Panetta et al. (2006). 
18  See Allen and Gale (2000) and Diamond and Rajan (2005). Allen and Carletti (2008c) and Frank et al. (2008) 
provide evidence on the transmission of liquidity shocks during the subprime crisis in the U.S..   15
vi)  Fire sales – This is the crisis outcome of the vicious circle illustrated above: sales of 
financial assets by enough banks strongly depress prices; other banks holding similar assets come 
under pressure and are forced to liquidate some of their own assets, closing the loop.
19 Problems 
may be aggravated by technical constraints (limits to arbitrage due to over-exposure or 
undercapitalization of traders) or by mark-to-market accounting, which can deter potential buyers 
(since short-run price reductions could severely affect their balance sheet, even if prices are 
expected to increase in the long run; see Section 4). 
1.3 A preliminary look at the data 
In section 1.1 we described the NFA mechanism with reference to a shock to the value of 
bank assets, which triggers an undesired increase in leverage and obliges banks to adjust. This 
example suggests that for the NFA mechanism to generate pro-cyclicality at least two conditions are 
necessary. The first is that the shock to financial asset prices must be pro-cyclical; if this were not 
the case (e.g. if negative shocks tended to occur during upturns), then the NFA would be muted. 
The second condition concerns leverage. Recall that banks were assumed to target an optimal 
leverage value. Clearly, the empirical strength of the NFA depends on whether this assumption 
holds in practice: if banks did not target leverage, letting equity absorb shocks, the vicious circle 
would be mitigated or even eliminated. The actual behavior of leverage over the cycle is therefore 
crucial to our analytical purposes. In this section we take a look at the available empirical evidence 
on these conditions. 
Concerning the first condition, there is indeed evidence that negative shocks to the value of 
assets tend to be associated to negative cyclical conditions, and vice-versa (for instance, corporate 
defaults and bad loans are more frequent in downturns).
20 In industrial countries asset prices tend to 
be positively correlated with output growth, but this property appears to be limited to certain classes 
of asset and to depend on the liquidity of national secondary markets.
21 In particular, stock prices 
have significant predictive power for economic activity
22; property prices tend to be less forward-
looking and more contemporaneously correlated with growth.
23 
Concerning the second condition, Adrian and Shin (2008) show that the relationship 
between increases in leverage and rises in asset prices in the U.S. differs according to groups of 
investors. For households it is negative, denoting passive behavior (that is, when the value of their 
assets falls, households passively accept an increase in leverage, and conversely when it rises). For 
non-financial firms there is no clear relationship. But commercial banks do appear to target leverage 
levels.
24 The relationship is also positive for security brokers and dealers (which used to include 
investment banks): that is, these operators increase leverage when assets prices go up and reduce it 
when they go down, making the greatest contribution to the vicious circle described above. The 
authors argue that in their case as for commercial banks, the supply curve for assets is downward 
                                                 
19  Kashyap et al. (2008) and Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008a) point out the externality nature of this effect.  
20 The correlation between asset prices and the business cycle reflects at least four factors. First, being determined on 
the basis of discounted expected cash flows, asset prices should reflect investors’ anticipation of future economic 
conditions and thus influence consumption and investment. Second, asset prices influence the value of collateral and 
thus the financing constraints on households and firms. Third, they may affect consumption via their impact on 
consumers’ permanent income, as predicted by life cycle models. Fourth, they influence investment by modifying the 
ratio between the firms’ market values and the cost of acquiring new capital (i.e. the Tobin’s q). 
21  See Borio et al. (1994), IMF (2000) and Borio et al. (2001). 
22  See Fama (1981), Fisher and Merton (1984), Asprem (1989), Fama (1990), Choi et al. (1999), Mauro (2000) and 
Avouyi-Dovi and Matheron (2005). 
23  The property prices are a much stronger leading indicator for the output gap (IMF, 2000). 
24  Targeting of leverage could be induced by market discipline: investors consider leverage an important gauge of firm 
behavior and health and so monitor it closely (Gropp and Heider, 2008). For banks, leverage targeting may also be 
induced by capital regulation, or by specific limits on leverage in some countries (see section 3.4.5).   16
sloping and the demand curve is upward sloping, generating market instability: for instance, a shock 
that causes a price drop reduces demand and increases supply, triggering further price declines. IMF 
(2008a) confirms this evidence for U.S. investment and commercial banks, and finds analogous 
evidence for the top 10 German commercial banks. It also finds that commercial bank leverage 
tends to be more pro-cyclical in financial systems characterized by a prevalence of arm’s length 
finance, such the United States and the United Kingdom. 
For additional insight into the relationship between assets and leverage, we replicated the 
graphical evidence in Adrian and Shin (2008) for the main euro area countries (Germany, France 
and Italy), the United Kingdom and Japan. Lacking quarterly data on tangible assets, we have used 
the national financial accounts to calculate quarterly rates of growth of both total financial assets 
and leverage, defining the latter as the ratio of financial assets to the difference between financial 
assets and financial liabilities. Results for households (unreported) strongly confirm the findings of 
Adrian and Shin: asset growth and leverage growth are negatively correlated in all countries, 
suggesting that this sector may dampen the effect of the NFA. Evidence for financial intermediaries, 
reported in Figure 1.1, suggests stark differences with respect to the U.S. evidence of a fixed target 
level for commercial banks.
25 U.K. monetary and financial institutions display a positive correlation 
between growth rates of assets and leverage, while all other countries show a negative relation.
26 
Thus, evidence in line with the NFA seems to be limited to the U.S. and the U.K..  
Further insights on the pro-cyclicality of the financial system can be gained from the 
analysis of the direct relationship between leverage and the business cycle, to see whether financial 
institutions do indeed expand leverage in periods of high GDP growth. In this case as well, the 
evidence of the NFA effect seems to be limited: the relationship between GDP growth and the 
change in leverage is negative, or at most flat, in all countries, including the U.S. (Figure 1.2).
27  
The measure of leverage used so far (like those used in previous analyses) reflects two 
components: (a) investors’ portfolio decisions (to increase or decrease exposure to each 
market/asset class); and (b) price changes that are largely exogenous to the individual investor. 
Genuine pro-cyclical behaviour should directly affect the former, as one would expect pro-cyclical 
investors to increase their balance sheet and leverage when prices increase and decrease them when 
prices fall. In what follows we separate these two components. For U.S. households, non-farm non-
financial companies and chartered commercial banks, we compute the quarterly average return on 
total assets
28 and plot it against the net acquisition of assets as a percentage of total assets (figure 
1.3). This simple exercise suggests that non-farm non-financial companies contribute to the NFA, 
exploiting the greater availability of collateral (determined by capital gains) to acquire new 
financial assets (Panel B); for households too the relationship between asset returns and asset 
                                                 
25  We believe that, given the structure of the European banking system, the appropriate U.S. term of comparison is the 
commercial banking sector. However, because the euro area flow of funds refers to “monetary financial institutions” 
(which include commercial banks, central banks and money market funds), our graph for the U.S. also refers to this 
sector. For this reason, and because we do not use data on tangible assets, our U.S. charts are not directly comparable 
to those of Adrian and Shin (2008).  
26  We had a deeper look at Italian banks over the last decade. While the general picture of a countercyclical leverage is 
confirmed for the largest banks, small banks appear to have a pro-cyclical leverage. 
27
  Using the first or second lag of leverage growth does not yield significant changes in these patterns (results 
unreported). 
28  We compute the return on total assets by subtracting the net flow of acquisitions of new assets from the increase in 
the outstanding stock of total assets. For households and non-farm non-financial corporations we used both data on 
tangible assets and data on financial assets; for chartered commercial banks, financial assets only.   17
Figure 1.1 
 
Financial Assets and Leverage of Monetary Financial Institutions (1) 
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Sources: Calculations based on national financial accounts (Federal Reserve System, Office for National Statistics, 
Bundesbank, Banque de France, Banca d'Italia and Bank of Japan). 
(1) Leverage is defined as the ratio between financial assets and the difference between financial assets and liabilities. 
Data refer to commercial banks, monetary authority and money market mutual funds for the United States, to banks for 
Japan and to monetary financial institutions (banks, central banks and money market mutual funds), for European 
countries.   18
Figure 1.2 
 
GDP (constant price) and Leverage of Monetary Financial Institutions (1) 
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Sources: Calculations based on national financial accounts (Federal Reserve System, Office for National Statistics, 
Bundesbank, Banque de France, Banca d'Italia and Bank of Japan) and GDP data (constant price) from the Statistical 
Data Warehouse (ECB).  
(1) Leverage is defined as the ratio between financial assets and the difference between financial assets and liabilities. 
Data refer to commercial banks, monetary authority and money market mutual funds for the United States, to banks for 
Japan and to monetary financial institutions (banks, central banks and money market mutual funds), for European 
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Panel B: Nonfarm Nonfinancial Firms 



















































Panel C: Commercial Banks 
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Panel D: Commercial Banks 
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Source: Calculations based on the Flow of Funds of the United States (Federal Reserve System).  
(1) Asset return and net acquisition of financial assets (liabilities) are defined, respectively, as 100*((TFA_t-
NAFA_t)/TFA_(t-1)-1), 100*(NAFA_t/TFA_(t-1)-1) (100*(NAFL_t/TFL_(t-1)-1)), where TFA_t, TFL_t, NAFA_t and 
NAFL_t are, respectively, total financial assets, total financial liabilities, net acquisition of financial assets and net 
acquisition of financial liabilities at time t.      20
acquisition is positive (Panel A), although weaker than that for firms.
29 However, the banks’ 
reaction to capital gains contradicts the prediction of the NFA: larger capital gains correspond to 
lower net acquisition of financial assets (the results are unchanged for liabilities; see Panels C and 
D). One possible interpretation is that banks smooth changes in the size of their balance sheet by 
offsetting larger gains with more prudent asset acquisition policies (e.g. moderating lending; and 
vice-versa).
30  
Another essential element in assessing the empirical relevance of the NFA is the actual level 
of leverage of financial institutions. In fact, higher level would magnify the underlying mechanisms 
(liquidation of banks’ assets, fire sales, liquidity spirals, etc.). To analyze this issue, in Figure 1.4 
(Panels A, B and C) we report the leverage (total assets over capital) of the largest international 
banks (that is, the intermediaries whose activity is most likely to have systemic impact on financial 
markets). By country, this comparative evidence must be taken with caution, as differences may be 
influenced by different accounting standards,
31 but time series comparisons are not affected by such 
considerations. In the years 2000-2006 the leverage of commercial banks rose significantly in all 
countries. The increase was sharpest in the United Kingdom (from 15 to 21 for the five largest 
banks) and Switzerland (it peaked at 34 for the top three banks). The ratio also rose significantly 
among U.S. investment banks, to a maximum of 29 in 2007; this is likely due also to a change in 
regulation (see section 3.4.5). The low level of leverage of U.S. commercial banks, and its flat 
trend, contrasts sharply with the much higher and growing leverage observed among U.S. 
investment banks; these differences presumably reflect regulatory provisions.  
Average values conceal the state of individual banks. In fact, in all countries the maximum 
value of bank leverage (the top value on the vertical line above each data point) is substantially 
higher than the average (represented by the data points on the curve).  
Data limitations preclude drawing conclusions about the cyclical behavior of hedge fund 
leverage. But Panel D of figure 1.4 clearly shows its decline since the onset of the current crisis. 
Overall, while NFA-type mechanisms are clearly at work in the current crisis, our analysis 
suggests that over long periods and broad number of countries the evidence in line with such 
mechanisms is not so clear cut. Our graphical evidence of leverage levels indicates that banks’ 
response to an adverse exogenous shock can indeed have serious repercussions on asset markets. 
However, given the simplicity of the analysis, our suggestive results do not allow us to draw firm 
conclusions. Further research is certainly warranted.   
 
 
                                                 
29  We replicate the analysis in terms of financial liabilities; results are unchanged.  
30  We also plotted banks’ assets and liabilities against the capital gains realized by households: if households do indeed 
react to capital gains by expanding their holdings of financial assets (and/or liabilities) as is suggested by the 
evidence reported in Panel A of figure 1.3, then the balance sheets of banks (which represent the main counterparty 
to households) should also show a parallel reaction. The results (not reported) are consistent with the previous ones: 
households seem to exploit the opportunity offered by higher collateral values to expand bank debt; financial 
institutions satisfy their additional demand. This is consistent with the prediction of the standard financial 
accelerator. 
31
  International comparisons of accounting measures of leverage are influenced by accounting practices on asset 
derecognition and consolidation (which affect the size of the balance sheet and hence leverage). Given the different 
criteria adopted by U.S. GAAP and IAS/IFRS and the considerable expansion of off-balance-sheet items and 
exposures in recent years, direct comparisons of the level of leverage across different countries could be misleading.   21
Figure 1.4 
Leverage of large international banks and hedge funds
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(1) Source: Fitch-Ibca. Leverage is defined as total assets over capital. The data points linked by a continuous line 
represent the weighted average of the leverage of the sample of banks in turn considered; the top of the vertical 
segments correspond to the maximum value of leverage of the sample of banks considered. Continental Europe: ten 
major commercial banks; Switzerland: three major banks; U.K.: five major commercial banks; US commercial banks: 
five major banks; US investment banks: five major banks. Data are as of June 2008. 
(2) Source: Merrill Lynch, Global Fund Managers survey. Based on a monthly survey of about 30-40 hedge funds.     22
2. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND LIBERALIZATION 
  Changes connected with radical liberalization and technological and financial innovation 
had a sweeping impact on the financial system, increasing its efficiency. In section 2.1 we briefly 
recall the main drivers of change, and in section 2.2 we review their implications for financial sector 
pro-cyclicality. 
2.1  Drivers of change 
(i)   Technological progress – Technological advances have had implications for bank relationships 
both with retail customers, due to credit scoring and remote banking, and with other intermediaries, 
mainly in connection with improvements in financial market infrastructures. 
- Credit scoring, remote banking – Greater availability of reliable information on borrowers, due 
to improvements in data collection and credit scoring techniques, allowed banks’ loan officers 
to cut down on monitoring and on resort to soft information.
32 Credit scoring is further 
encouraged by bank consolidation.
33 Technology has fostered more intense use of remote 
banking. 
- Improvements in financial market infrastructure – Over the last 20 years, the post-trading 
infrastructure that supports modern financial markets has achieved enormous technology-driven 
improvement. The global move towards real time gross settlement systems for interbank 
payments and the introduction of risk control measures in clearing systems have diminished 
settlement risk. In most industrial countries the creation of central securities depositories has 
permitted dematerialization of securities and simplification of bookkeeping, resulting in large 
efficiency gains. The development of central clearing houses for the trading of the main 
currencies has reduced credit risk in foreign exchange transactions. As a result, risks and 
transaction costs have fallen dramatically, fostering unprecedented growth in the volume of 
national and cross-border payments. For instance, in 2008 the Target system handled a daily 
volume of payments averaging almost €2.7 trillion, as against just over €1.0 trillion in 2000. In 
addition, interdependence among the world payment systems has increased, strengthening the 
global infrastructure but increasing the potential for contagion.
34 The net effect of these two 
trends on the overall quantity of risk in the financial system is unclear. 
(ii)   Financial innovation – This issue has been a source of concern for policymakers at least since 
the mid-eighties. Some of the key issues (e.g. the consequences of securitization; the potential 
underpricing of risks and the consequences for financial stability) have been clearly analyzed by 
CGFS (1986). However, problems have been exacerbated by the dramatic acceleration of financial 
innovation in recent years. The array of new financial products and intermediaries is too long to list 
here.
35 The standardization of contracts made possible and fostered by technological progress 
contributed to the spectacular development of securitization, whereby banks repackage individual 
loans for resale on the market. As many commentators have pointed out, the wave of innovations 
has had two main consequences. On the positive side, it reduced market incompleteness, with 
beneficial effects in terms of risk sharing and access to finance for previously excluded agents. On 
the negative side, it increased the complexity of financial products and intermediaries. Furthermore, 
because they are often tailored to specific needs or are in an initial stage of development, new 
                                                 
32  See Rajan (2005). 
33  See Stein (2002) and Berger and Scott Frame (2007). 
34  See CPSS (2008). 
35  For a review of the financial products that became available in recent years see Ferguson et al. (2007).   23
products generally trade in opaque and illiquid OTC markets. This is a challenge for regulators, 
analysts and market participants. Again, the net effect of these trends on the overall quantity of risk 
in the financial system is unclear. 
(iii)   Financial sector liberalization and deregulation – Technology and financial innovation have 
interacted with regulatory change, modifying the structure and boundaries of credit markets.
36 For 
example, until the early 1990s the United States limited interstate branching and in some cases even 
mandated unit branching. As technology allowed remote competition, regulation limiting branching 
was eventually eliminated. In the European Union the Second Banking Directive removed entry 
barriers in the early 1990s, allowing banks from any EU country to branch freely into other member 
states, and competition increased significantly.
37 Together with product innovation and persistently 
favorable financing conditions, this facilitated households’ access to credit and relaxed financing 
conditions for first-time home buyers, contributing to sweeping changes in household finance over 
the last fifteen years.
38  
2.2  Implications for pro-cyclicality 
The changes described above have created a series of mechanisms that influence the 
efficiency, the stability and the pro-cyclicality of the financial system. 
(i)    From relationship banking to arm’s length banking – The move towards arm’s length banking 
under the impetus of automation has contributed to a process that Rajan (2005) dubbed the 
“commodification” of financial transactions. By making monitoring less valuable to loan officers, 
this process weakened the incentive to collect soft information, possibly to the detriment of credit 
quality.
39 According to some commentators, this contributed to the explosive growth of subprime 
lending in the U.S.
40 
Furthermore, credit scoring, unlike relationship lending, relies on balance sheet information, 
which mainly reflects past performance. Thus, during economic downturns, when balance sheet 
indicators worsen, loan supply will tend to contract (and conversely during expansions), 
augmenting pro-cyclicality. What is more, the banks that rely on credit scoring for automated loan 
origination all tend to use highly similar models, which makes their decisions more correlated, as in 
models of herding.
41 
(ii)    Securitization – It has been argued that asymmetric information on the secondary market for 
loans may weaken banks’ incentives to screen/monitor.
42 Securitization and the originate-to-
distribute (OTD) model of financial intermediation, at least in the form that developed over the last 
decade, are likely to be plagued by systematic underestimation of liquidity risk; moreover, they 
reduce the information on the ultimate bearers of risk, making the financial system opaque and 
prone to sudden collapses of mutual trust.
43 On the other hand, securitization can improve risk 
allocation by enabling investors to diversify.  
                                                 
36  See Bhattacharya et al. (1998). 
37  See Angelini and Cetorelli (2003). 
38  See Ferguson et al. (2007).  
39  Casolaro and Mistrulli (2008) and DeYoung et al. (2006) provide evidence for Italy and the U.S., respectively, that 
“proximity” stimulates monitoring. 
40  See Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008). 
41  See Allen et al. (2004) for a survey on the properties of credit risk models. 
42  See Parlour and Plantin (2008). 
43  The recent experience suggests that risk may have been shifted off the originators’ balance sheets only formally; in 
many cases banks have been called upon to act as soon as the risk materialized.   24
To the extent that securitization involves loans with low information sensitivity, banks’ 
incentives might be affected only marginally.
44 Intermediaries might retain the junior (riskiest) 
tranches to signal the unobservable loan quality or their commitment to monitor borrowers.
45 
Moreover, if securitization is not a one-off process, banks might want to build a reputation for not 
selling lemons; they might even end up securitizing only high-quality loans.  
Overall, the effect of credit risk transfer techniques on credit quality is ambiguous and could 
well differ strongly according to market segment. The evidence suggests that securitization 
impaired screening and monitoring, resulting in increased risk-taking.
46 But these results refer only 
to the U.S. subprime market.  
(iii)    Competition in the banking sector – Whereas the efficiency effects of competition are well-
known, the debate on the implications for financial stability is still open. On the one hand, the 
“competition-fragility” view holds that competition may induce banks to do “whatever it takes” to 
survive, including excessive risk, therefore contributing to financial sector pro-cyclicality. Some 
observers have argued that heightened competition may have contributed to the financial crisis: for 
example, according to Eichengreen
47 the aggressive conduct of investment banks (distributing 
complex derivative securities, jacking up leverage to sustain profits) was to some extent a reaction 
to competition from commercial banks following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (however, see 
section 3.4.5 for an alternative explanation). More generally, a number of papers argue that 
competition induces higher risk and leverage and lowers credit quality.
48 On the other hand, the 
“competition-stability” view maintains that competition enhances efficiency and stability.
49 Not 
surprisingly, a third strand of the literature contends that general conclusions cannot be drawn or 
that they depend heavily on model specification.
50 
The empirical evidence is not conclusive. Some authors find that increased competition is 
associated with increased risk taking,
51 whereas others fail to support this conclusion
52 or favor the 
                                                 
44  Drucker and Puri (2007). 
45  Franke and Krahnen (2005) find that the equity tranche is larger when the quality of the securitized loans is lower. 
46  Keys et al. (2008) show that the loans that are more likely to be securitized have 20% higher default probability than 
otherwise similar loans with less likelihood of securitization. Mian and Sufi (2008) show that an expansion in the 
credit supply led to the rapid increase in house prices from 2001 to 2005 and subsequent defaults from 2005 to 2007. 
47  Reference available at http://dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=16596. See also comments by Dany Rodrick 
at http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2008/09/can-too-much-competition-be-the-culprit.html. 
48  Keeley (1990) argues that in competitive environments excessive risk-taking tends to be more severe, as in case of 
default bank owners lose their license which has little value. Freixas et al. (2007) show that the probability of 
financing low-quality projects increases as the number of banks increases. Bolt and Tieman (2004) find that loan 
market competition loosens the criteria for granting loans, resulting in higher default probability. 
49  Boyd and Graham (1996) show that beyond deposit insurance, another, implicit, form of guarantee is the “too-big-to-
fail” theorem, which makes more concentrated banking markets take excessive risk. 
50  In Boot and Marinç (2007) competition improves the monitoring incentives of efficient banks and lessens those of 
low-quality banks. Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) show that if the borrower – rather than the bank – chooses the 
riskiness of the project, increased competition reduces risk (lower banking competition results in higher loan rates, 
which reduces borrowers’ profits and induces them to seek more risk). Allen and Gale (2004) consider a broad 
variety of models and find that only in some cases is there a trade-off between competition and financial stability.  
51
  Keeley (1990) finds that increased competition following the relaxation of state branching restrictions in the 1980s, 
induced U.S. banks to increase risk. This result supports the franchise value paradigm and is consistent with Jiménez 
et al. (2007), who find that in the 1990s Lerner indexes for the Spanish loan and deposit markets are negatively 
related with non-performing loans. 
52  Boyd and Runkle (1993) find no evidence that large U.S. banks have significantly greater stability (higher z-scores): 
the advantages of diversification do not lower default probability because of higher leverage. Boyd and Graham 
(1996) find that large U.S. banks were more likely to fail than small banks in the period 1971-1986 but less likely in 
the period 1987-1994.   25
opposite one.
53 In a recent survey, Berger et al. (2004) conclude that while bank competition is 
good from a social perspective, the effect of low concentration is ambiguous. This may simply 
reflect the difficulty of disentangling the various effects.
54 More recently, Beck et al. (2006), based 
on information for 69 countries, argue that both higher concentration and tougher competition are 
associated with lower frequency of banking crises.
55 Although they do not explore the mechanism 
linking concentration to the frequency of banking crisis, this result may reflect a possible trade-off: 
banking competition may promote stability only to the extent that it does not entail a reduction in 
bank size and concentration. 
Few theoretical studies explicitly examine the effect of competition on the pro-cyclicality of 
lending supply. In the model of Rajan (1994), markets judge bank managers by their performance 
relative to that of other banks, so that the evaluation forgives poor results more readily when others 
also get low profits. In this environment, managers tend to behave myopically, loosening credit 
standards and inefficiently inflating current profits (as by extending new credit to low-quality 
borrowers when this provides sufficiently high up-front fees). The model’s assumption that when 
the economy is weak, good and bad bank managers get identically low profits implies that it is 
precisely in a downturn that banks coordinate to tighten credit policy (as this is when bad managers 
do not need to inflate profits in order to mimic good ones). 
Ruckes (2004) reaches similar conclusions assuming that the bank’s incentive to screen 
projects depends on the expected return to this activity, which tends to decrease in downturns; in the 
extreme case in which no project is profitable, there is no useful information to be gained from 
costly screening, and banks are unwilling to extend loans on an unsecured basis. This means that in 
recessions banks reduce credit supply by tightening lending standards (i.e. requiring more collateral 
and covenants).
56 Based on the “winner’s curse” argument, the paper shows that such pro-
cyclicality is exacerbated by banking competition. 
Notice that the potential pro-cyclical effects of bank competition should be evaluated against 
its well documented advantages in terms of efficiency and, possibly, higher risk taking. A crucial 
question is whether institutional arrangements exist to protect competition while at the same time 
limiting potential pro-cyclicality. For example, if competition exacerbates credit supply fluctuations 
due to winner’s curse mechanisms, as in Ruckes (2004), then this problem could be addressed by 
inducing banks to share information on loan rejections.
57 
(iv)    Financial market globalization – Another distinct consequence of financial deregulation and 
technical progress has been the surge in international financial integration. For industrial countries, 
the sum of foreign assets and liabilities has increased much faster than either GDP (Figure 2.1, 
                                                 
53 Boyd et al. (2006) find that banks’ market power is positively related to their probability of default. Berger et al. 
(2000) show that entry of foreign banks has positive effects on efficiency, at least in developed nations. 
54 Berger et al. (2008) find that market power is positively related to: (i) the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans; 
(ii) the z-score; (iii) the equity-to-asset ratio. The authors argue that although market power may result in riskier 
loans, overall bank risk need not increase, as banks may apply risk-mitigation techniques (more capital, reduced 
interest rate risk, sales of loans or credit derivatives, a smaller loan portfolio).  
55 Beck et al. (2006) find that: (i) concentrated banking systems are less likely to experience systemic crises; (ii) entry 
restrictions increase bank fragility; (iii) the openness and competitiveness of banking markets and the economy 
reduce the probability of systemic banking crises. 
56 In upturns, when most of the investment projects are profitable, screening incentives are low again and credit 
standards are loose. Screening incentives are greatest in intermediate states of the economy. 
57 An interesting example is given by Italy, where this type of information sharing is provided through the Central 
Credit Register (in response to requests for preliminary information).   26
panel a) or trade (panel b); in developing countries and emerging countries the trend has been 
relatively limited.
58 
  Figure 2.1: Trends in global finance 
   (a) International financial integration             (b) Financial versus trade integration 
 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
What are the implications of financial integration for financial sector pro-cyclicality? One 
view is that financial integration provides better opportunities for countries to diversify 
idiosyncratic risk, which should weaken the correlations between consumption and GDP at the 
national level and strengthen those between consumption in different countries, leaving GDP-based 
measures of business cycle synchronization unchanged, or even reduced, if financial linkages 
stimulated product specialization.
59 An alternative view is that large-scale geographical financial 
diversification accentuates and hastens the transmission of regional shocks to other areas, turning 
them into global shocks. For example, a bank run in one country might lead to a run in connected 
banking systems,
60 fostering the transmission of crises and ultimately producing more closely 
correlated GDP-based measures of business cycles.
61  
To answer the foregoing question, one must decide which view is correct. The latter view 
entails that financial integration generates pro-cyclicality by increasing cross-country GDP 
correlations, i.e. by reducing the ability of national cycles to offset each other. The former view has 
opposite implications. The issue is clearly complex. The available evidence is heterogeneous, and 
we do not attempt a systematic review. Overall, our reading of the literature suggests that the degree 
of international business cycle synchronization over the globalization period 1985-2005 is not 
historically high,
62 although this is subject to several caveats (due to differences in methodology, 
number of countries covered, length of the periods considered, etc.). 
                                                 
58  See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Ferguson et al. (2007) for recent evidence on international financial integration. 
59  Kose et al. (2003). 
60  See for example Allen and Morris (1998) 
61  Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) derive this effect within a formal model of crises.  
62  According to Kose et al. (2008a), this reflects an increase in synchronization among both industrial and developing 
countries, but divergence or decoupling between these two groups, and a decline in the importance of a common 
global factor. However, Heathcote and Perri (2002, 2004) find that the synchronization of the U.S. business cycle 
with that of the main industrialized countries has declined significantly over the financial globalization period. Their 
theoretical model reverses the usual causality link: growth in cross-border financial flows took place to exploit the 
increased diversification possibilities offered by this decreased real synchronization.  
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Few works directly address the question of whether financial linkage cause greater 
synchronization of world business cycles. The answer is that it does, but the effect is indirect and 
weak.
63 Some elements suggest that this link has strengthened in recent periods. First and foremost, 
the recent crisis clearly reinforces the argument. The ever-closer correlations among financial 
variables in industrial economies over the last ten years (Figure 2.2) suggest that financial shocks 
are becoming truly global. And there is indirect evidence that capital inflows influence the business 
cycle in emerging economies via their effect on the national monetary policy stance. From 2001 to 
2007 growth in net foreign assets of the monetary authorities has been strongly correlated with 
growth in reserve money, M2, and credit to the private sector (see CGFS, 2009).  
 




Source: Panetta et al. (2006). Note: In percent. Calculated as the proportion of portfolio variance due to covariances between 
the domestic markets included in the portfolio. Bond and stock markets are equally weighted portfolios of benchmark indices 
for the United States, Germany and Japan. 
 
 
(v)   Households’ finance  – The household sector’s exposure to financial risk has increased 
substantially over the past fifteen years,
64 with steadily rising debt, a significant increase in real and 
financial wealth both in absolute terms and relative to disposable income, an increase in risky assets 
as a proportion of total assets, and the gradual shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution 
pension plans, which has shifted the burden of providing for retirement onto households (see Group 
of ten, 2005). Longevity risk has also increased (see Visco, 2007).  
We have analyzed the effect of debt and leverage in Section 1. In this respect, the U.S. 
differs from European countries for higher loan-to-value ratios and more frequent mortgage equity 
withdrawals, which increase households’ exposure to the fluctuations of house prices.
65  
Here we emphasize the greater sensitivity of households to changes in asset prices and 
wealth, which is likely to have a significant impact on consumption. The increase in real and 
financial wealth, coupled with that in the share of risky assets, means that households are more 
exposed to changes in asset prices and more influenced by changes in wealth. Given the cyclicality 
                                                 
63  Kose et al. (2003) find that restrictions on capital movements weaken output correlations but that various measures 
of financial integration fail to strengthen consumption correlations. The hypothesis that financial integration has 
increased consumption risk sharing finds only limited support among industrialized countries and none among 
developing economies (see Kose et al., 2003, 2008b). Peek and Rosengreen (1997) show that the Japanese banking 
crisis of the 1990s had real effects on the U.S. economy through the American affiliates of Japanese banks. 
64  For an in-depth analysis see Ferguson et al. (2007). 
65  For a comprehensive analysis of housing finance in the euro area see Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee 
of the ESCB, 2009).   28
of asset prices (see Section 1), consumption may have become more sensitive to the business cycle, 
intensifying pro-cyclicality.
66 
Households’ exposure to financial risk has been accentuated by their growing direct 
involvement in financing retirement, due to aging (mainly in industrial countries) and to the recent 
pension reforms in many countries.
67 For decades now the burden of providing for retirement has 
been shifted increasingly directly on households, who should save more than before (all else being 
equal; in fact, at least at the aggregate level there are no signs of this happening), invest more in 
financial assets, and therefore face more financial risk. Furthermore, households have to bear a 
larger share of longevity risk (loosely speaking, the risk of outliving their savings). 
 (vi)  Interest rates  – Low interest rates can cause pro-cyclicality in the financial sector by 
encouraging excessive risk-taking. The inverse relationship between asset values and interest rates 
means that, other things equal, when rates are low the value of collateral is high, and vice-versa. So 
low rates can drive credit growth above the level compatible with a “normal” value of collateral. 
The financial accelerator may be reinforced by banks’ lending policies. It has been shown that 
under imperfect information bank managers affected by short-termism have an incentive to adopt an 
excessively liberal credit policy (Rajan, 1994, 2005). And recent evidence confirms this thesis: 
lower short-term interest rates decrease the probability of default on existing loans but increase it on 
new loans, so the latter are riskier than average.
68 Furthermore, periods of low interest rates tend to 
be accompanied by low volatility and high risk appetite.
69 This mechanism can in turn be reinforced 
by financial innovation; the evidence shows that securitization allows faster credit growth,
70 which 
may entail even more bad loans in periods of low interest rates.  
Low interest rates may also induce institutional investors to take on excessive risk. Rajan 
(2005) reports various mechanisms. For instance, insurance companies and pension funds may have 
a large share of liabilities that are fixed in nominal terms. In periods of low rates they seek higher 
returns to meet their commitments; they tend to perceive mainly the upside and to overlook the 
downside risk, because if they did nothing they would fail to fulfil their obligations and would be in 
trouble anyway.  
The role of monetary policy in this context is not obvious. In fact, short-term interest rates 
are typically countercyclical. However, it has been argued that the improvements in monetary 
                                                 
66  Households’ sensitivity to asset prices depends on the magnitude of the wealth effect. The evidence indicates that the 
long-run marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is around 3-5% in the U.S., somewhat higher for the UK and 
Canada and lower in the euro area (see Altissimo et al., 2005, and Ludwig and Sløk, 2004). Given that net wealth in 
different countries is between 7 and 10 times disposable income, a drop in asset prices of 20% would cause a drop in 
consumption of between 4% and 10% (taking realistic parameter combinations, the likely range is between 4% and 
6%), which is sufficient to cause serious macroeconomic fluctuations. This estimate should be taken cautiously, 
however, as consumption may respond asymmetrically to asset price changes in upturns and in downturns, or to 
households’ differential response to permanent vs. transitory changes in asset prices. The composition of wealth is 
also relevant, as the marginal propensity to consume is thought to be greatest for non-equity financial assets (because 
of their high liquidity and predictable returns), lowest for equity and somewhere in between for housing (illiquid but 
distributed among income classes). Finally, mortgage equity withdrawal mechanisms, common in the U.S. and the 
U.K., may also influence the relationship between households’ wealth and consumption. 
67  See CGFS (2007). 
68  See Jiménez et al. (2008) and Ioannidou et al. (2007). However, banks apparently fail to recognize this, so the 
interest rates on new loans do not reflect their greater risk, and credit standards deteriorate. Low interest rates thus 
lead to a build-up of risks in the banking system, which tend to materialize when rates finally increase. 
69  See, for example, Pericoli and Taboga (2008), Rudebusch, Swanson and Wu (2006), Kim and Wright (2005). For an 
explanation of the low level of long-term bond yields not based on risk premia, see Taboga (2009).  
70  See Altunbas et al. (2009). Banks resorting to securitization are better able to shelter loan supply from the effects of 
monetary policy and have an increased capacity to supply new loans.   29
policymaking worldwide over the last two decades may have played a role in the establishment of 
an environment of low and stable inflation and excessively low short-term rates. This may have led 
to excessive risk-taking, and therefore to increased financial sector pro-cyclicality (Borio et al., 
2001; Borio and White, 2004). This thesis can be accommodated within the theoretical framework 
of Diamond and Rajan (2008), who show that the incentive of highly leveraged institutions to 
become more illiquid increases with expectations that future rates will be low. Diamond and Rajan 
(2009) explicitly cite the commitment to keeping short-term rates low (the so-called “Greenspan 
put”) and argue that in good times monetary policy should be kept tighter than strictly necessary 
based on current economic conditions, in order to diminish banks’ incentive to take on liquidity 
risk.   30
3. BANK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
Since the end of the 1980s the G-10 countries have introduced capital requirements based on 
risk assets. At the microeconomic level, the reasons for capital regulation include potentially 
excessive risk-taking by managers induced by flat-premium deposit insurance schemes
71 and 
insufficient monitoring of banks’ lending policies by small, dispersed depositors.
72 From a 
macroeconomic perspective, capital requirements are one of the tools available to reduce the 
externalities associated with bank failures (in terms, for example, of public funds needed in case of 
systemic crises or contagion across intermediaries).
73  
Can capital requirements generate pro-cyclicality? In theory, in a frictionless economy they 
should not. If bank capital could be freely adjusted, capital requirements should not induce a denial 
of credit to projects with positive present net value. However, as we saw in Section 1, imperfections 
in capital markets do exist, and an accelerator mechanism may generate feedback from bank capital 
to the real economy. In practice, risk-based capital requirements tend to generate pro-cyclicality, 
because risk itself is counter-cyclical both in quantity and in value. The quantity of risk tends to rise 
during contractions, partly reflecting the process of accumulation during expansions.
74 Similarly, 
the price of risk – that is, investors’ risk aversion – decreases during upswings and increases during 
downswings.
75   
In this section we analyze the potential pro-cyclicality arising from the Basel supervisory 
framework. After reviewing the institutional setting,
76 in section 3.2 we examine credit risk, likely a 
more important source of pro-cyclicality than either operational or market risk. In section 3.3 we 
review the empirical evidence. In section 3.4 we examine the mechanisms now being considered by 
scholars and regulators to reduce the undesired pro-cyclical effects of capital regulation.  
3.1 The institutional setting 
A common international approach to bank capital regulation was introduced for the first time 
by the accord adopted in 1988, so-called Basel I, which introduced a minimum capital requirement 
equal to 8% of banks’ risk-weighted total assets. Risk-weighted assets were computed assigning to 
each asset category a fixed weight (decided by the regulator) according to presumed degree of 
risk.
77 
The New Capital Accord, the so-called Basel II, was stipulated in 2004, revised in 2006 and 
finally implemented in Europe at the beginning of 2008 (in the U.S. it has not been implemented 
yet).  Basel II was designed to strengthen the link between risk exposure and capital.
78 A key 
difference with respect to Basel I is that the risk weights are no longer specified for broad asset 
                                                 
71  See Kohen and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988), and references therein. See also Rochet (1992) for 
a more recent study along these lines. 
72  See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). 
73  See Kashyap and Stein (2004). 
74  See Borio et al. (2001). 
75  See Lowe (2002).  
76  For a comprehensive review of the institutional setting and of the internal rating methods, see Cannata (ed.) (2007). 
77  If a bank held two risky assets, loans to firms (L
F) and to other banks (L
B), then its capital requirement K had to 







lb are the fixed risk weights for loans to firms and to banks. The weights were 0% for sovereigns, 
20% for banks, 50% for mortgage loans, 100% for all other loans (which include loans to firms and households). 
78  See Taylor and Goodhart (2004), BCBS (2006).   31
classes (e.g. loans to firms) and invariant over time but are now tailored to the individual asset (e.g. 
a loan to a given firm) and, in principle, vary with time. Under Basel II, capital requirements are 
explicitly calibrated on unexpected losses (a proxy of the risks that banks incur)
79 and can be 
computed using two different approaches: “standardised” (SA) and “internal ratings-based” (IRB). 
The IRB approach itself has two versions: “foundation” (FIRB) and “advanced” (AIRB),
 which 
differ in the number of risk parameters the bank must estimate.  
Under SA, the risk weights are based on the ratings computed by rating agencies recognized 
by supervisors (“external ratings”). For instance, Table 3.1 reports the relationship between ratings 
and risk weights currently adopted for corporate loans. Under IRB the weights are computed by the 
bank itself on the basis of its own estimate of the riskiness of each asset/borrower (“internal 




RISK WEIGHTS FOR CORPORATE LOANS  
IN THE STANDARDISED APPROACH 
Risk Weights   External Rating   
New approach  Basel I 
   From AAA to AA-   20%  100% 
    From A+ to A-   50%  100% 
  From BBB+ to BB- and unrated  100%  100% 
  Below BB-    150%  100% 
Note: the external rating scale is the one used by Standard & Poor’s.  
 
In the IRB approach, the capital requirement for each asset is obtained by a specific formula 
(see box) factoring in the following four parameters: (i) the probability of default (PD) of the 
borrower; (ii) the exposure at default (EAD); (iii) the loss given default (LGD); and (iv) the 
maturity of the loan (M). Under the FIRB approach the bank must estimate only PD, the other 
parameters being set by supervisors; under AIRB the bank must also estimate the other parameters.  
                                                 
79  Strictly speaking, this applies to the IRB approach only. Expected losses are covered by loss provisions. However, 
under the new accounting rules provisions can be accumulated only for incurred losses (i.e. if there is some evidence 
of impairment), and not in a statistical sense. See section 4.    32
   
Box. Capital requirements under the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach 
 
The model defined by the Basel II Accord to calculate the capital requirements against 
banks’ credit risk is a simplified version of the Credit Metrics model, which in turn stems from the 
model of Merton (1974). Formally, the value of the assets of any borrower i at time t is defined as  
t i t t t t i X V , , 1 ε ρ ρ − + =  
where Xt and εi,t are independent (standard normal) random variables respectively representing a 
common and an idiosyncratic risk factor. The common factor Xt can be interpreted as a variable 
summarizing the state of the economy. The parameter  t ρ  measures the correlation among the 
values of the assets of the different borrowers. The model assumes that borrower i defaults when Vi,t 
falls below a given threshold. In practice, parameters referring to individual borrowers (PD) and 
parameters that are specific to each type of loan (LGD, EAD and M) are integrated in a portfolio 
model in order to compute the unexpected loss and the associated regulatory capital. 
To limit discretion by intermediaries, Basel II defines some key methodological steps: (1) 
total losses must be computed at a 99.9% confidence interval (that is, assuming that the value of the 
common risk factor lies in the worst 0.1% of its distribution); (2) the correlations  t ρ  are fixed by 
the regulation;
1 (3) it is assumed that the underlying loan portfolio is fully diversified (i.e. that 
individual loans are identical and of small size). 
In the model as designed, the probability of default of borrower i, conditional upon Xt being 
in its 0.1% left tail, is given by: 
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where  ) (x Φ is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable. In the last 
equality, the normality of εi,t and assumption (1) have been used. This reasoning led to the use of 
this formula in computing the capital requirements on loans. To exemplify, neglecting for simplicity 
the effect of maturity, the formula is:  
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Term a) is the expected value of credit losses conditional on the common risk factor being in 
the worst 0.1% tail of its distribution. Term b) is the unconditional expected loss, obtained by 
multiplying the individual probability of default of the loan by the loss given default. The capital 
requirement is given by the unexpected loss – the difference between a) and b) – as the expected 
loss is to be covered by specific loss provisions.
2 Finally, 1.06 is a multiplying factor chosen by the 
Basel Committee to keep the overall level of capital requirement in line with Basel I on an 
aggregate basis. Basel II confirmed a minimum capital ratio of at least 8% of risk-weighted assets. 
In this respect, the capital requirements K are translated into risk weights by multiplying by 12.5 
(the reciprocal of 8%)
3;  K w · 5 . 12 = and the risk-weighted assets are obtained as w EAD RWA ⋅ =  
Figure 3.1 reports the relation between the estimated risk of a borrower (its PD) and the risk   33
weights assigned to corporate loans in the FIRB approach. The concavity of the curve indicates that 
capital absorption increases less than proportionally with estimated risk. Still, as the estimated PD 
moves up along the horizontal axis, migrating from lower to higher risk classes (a phenomenon that 
is frequent in downturns), capital requirements increase. Finally, an increase in the LGD shifts the 
curve upward (a decrease, downward), because the risk weights are linearly dependent on that 
variable.
4 
The potential pro-cyclicality of the Basel II regulation clearly depends on the cyclical 
behaviour of the parameters PD, EAD, LGD, and M, which we analyze in the main text. 
 
Figure 3.1
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1  The correlations depend on the type of portfolio, and in some cases they vary within a given interval. Specifically, for 
corporate loans the correlations range between 12% and 24%, depending on the PD. They are 15% for residential 
mortgages, 4% for qualifying revolving exposures and between 3% and 16% for other retail exposures. 
2  If total net value adjustments should exceed expected losses, the absolute value of the difference is included among 
the positive elements of tier 2 capital for an amount up to 0.6% of credit-risk-weighted assets. If total net value 
adjustments are less than expected losses, the entire absolute value of the difference is deducted from capital (50% 
from tier 1 and 50% from tier 2 capital)   
3  Applying the formula with an LGD of 45% (i.e. equal to the regulatory parameter in the FIRB approach) and a PD 
equal to 0.03%, one gets w=14.44%. If one assumes a higher PD (20%), then w=238.23%. A reduction of the 
correlation parameters is permitted for firms with annual sales of less than €50 million (to take into account their 
lesser dependence on the business cycle). Thus for a firm with annual sales of €5 million, w ranges from 11.30% to 
188.42%.  
4  The same linear relation is also valid with reference to maturity (M). 
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3.2 Capital requirements and pro-cyclicality 
If losses are counter-cyclical the simple mechanism underlying Basel I may generate pro-
cyclicality. With capital market frictions, a shock to banks’ assets produces a pro-cyclical 
movement in bank capital, and through the mechanism described in Section 1, this feeds back to the 
economy. Is such pro-cyclicality reduced or enhanced by the switch to Basel II? Note first that the 
new regulation still relies on a formula that links capital requirements to assets, so the mechanism 
just described for Basel I will still work. The outcome thus depends on the cyclical behaviour of the 
risk weights: the new procedure generates greater pro-cyclicality if the weights increase in 
downturns, reflecting the deterioration of ratings, and decrease during expansions. Most of the 
following sub-section will be devoted to this issue.  
Note preliminarily that rating methodologies, used by rating agencies and by banks, can 
follow either a ‘point-in-time’ (PIT) or a ‘through-the-cycle’ (TTC) approach. PIT ratings represent 
an assessment of the borrower’s ability to discharge his obligations over a relatively short horizon 
(e.g. a year), and so can vary considerably over the cycle. The TTC approach focuses on a longer 
horizon, abstracting in principle from current cyclical conditions. TTC ratings are therefore 
inherently more stable than PIT ratings, although their predictive power for default rates is lower.
80 
3.2.1 Potential pro-cyclical effects in the standardised approach 
The added pro-cyclicality of this approach depends on the behaviour of the external ratings, as 
they have a direct relationship with risk weights. Rating agencies claim that they use the TTC 
approach. But are they actually successful in doing this? The answer is not straightforward. Figure 
3.2 suggests that, in the United States and the euro area, in economic contractions ratings 
downgrades become relatively more frequent than upgrades, and conversely in expansions. The 
empirical evidence available confirms that agency ratings retain some positive correlation with the 
business cycle,
81 although they are less pro-cyclical than market-based indicators of credit risk.
82 
Notice however that even if agencies rate correctly through the cycle, their ratings could still exhibit 
some co-movement with economic activity: to the extent that changes in firms’ prospects are driven 
by long-lived shocks, and these shocks also induce business cycle fluctuations, the long-term 
creditworthiness of firms, and hence their ratings, should parallel the cycle (Löffler, 2008). The 
question, then, is whether the ratings show excessive co-movements with the cycle. This is harder to 
address, as it entails additional assumptions, but the analyses performed to date suggest that ratings 
do not generally exhibit excessive sensitivity to the business cycle.
83 However, this issue will have 
to be revisited to include the most recent years, to carefully examine the performance of rating 
agencies during the crisis.   
Another factor that may affect pro-cyclicality in the SA is the degree of “granularity” of the 
system (the number of rating classes). Empirically, borrowers migrate to riskier rating classes in 
downturns, less risky in upswings. Thus, a large number of narrow risk-buckets would increase the 
number of migrations, magnifying pro-cyclicality. Furthermore, because the risk weights change in 
                                                 
80  For a comparison of the PIT (cyclical) and TTC (permanent) components of default risk, see Löffler (2008).  
81  For example, Cantor and Mann (2003), Löffler (2008), Amato and Furfine (2004), Segoviano and Lowe (2002) and 
Ferri et al. (1999) show that credit ratings are positively correlated with the business cycle. Transition matrices 
(estimates of the probability of moving from one rating class to another) tend to exhibit higher frequency of 
downgrades during recessions than during expansions. 
82 Such indicators can be obtained from Merton-type models, from credit spreads and from equity-based measures of 
risk. See Nickell et al. (2000), Bangia et al. (2002), Cantor and Mann (2003) and Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003). 
83 These analyses use models of ratings determination that take into account firms’ business and financial risks, in 
addition to macro indicators; see Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998), Amato and Furfine (2004).   35
discrete fashion, the system may generate significant cliff effects. For example, for corporate loans 
a downgrade from A- to BBB+ would increase the risk weight from 50% to 100%, doubling the 
capital requirement (see Table 3.1). This problem is aggravated by the fact that when ratings adjust, 
they tend to overreact to current conditions,
84 especially for structured finance products.
85  
Summing up, it would appear that the Basel II-SA is probably more risk-sensitive than Basel 
I, and therefore more prone to generate pro-cyclical effects. 
3.2.2 Potential pro-cyclical effects in the Internal Ratings Based approach 
Basel II establishes that banks, in estimating the parameters relevant to capital requirements 
(PD, LGD, EAD and M), must consider borrowers’ ability to repay the loan under current 
conditions but also in potentially adverse cyclical conditions, using data for long enough periods. In 
other words, the spirit of the regulation requires banks to follow a TTC estimation approach. As we 
shall see, for various reasons they often fail to conform to this spirit, so that all these parameters 
may end up playing a role in terms of pro-cyclicality. 
 
Figure 3.2 















































   
Note: ratings drift is equal to upgrades minus downgrades divided by the number of rated issuers (source: Moody’s). GDP 
growth is the annualized quarterly percentage change in GDP (source: Thomson Financial). 
 
Probability of default (PD) – Basel II specifies that the probability of default can be estimated by 
three different techniques: (i) banks’ internal default experience; (ii) statistical default models; (iii) 
mapping banks’ internal ratings onto external ratings.
86 Regardless of the technique chosen, and 
even though practices may differ across banks, lines of business and categories of borrower, in 
                                                 
84  See Amato and Furfine (2004). 
85  Studies performed before the subprime crisis show that – due to pooling, which mitigates exposure to idiosyncratic 
risk – structured finance products more stable ratings than bonds. But when the ratings of structured finance products 
do change, they move by several classes, perhaps reflecting the fact that these instruments are highly leveraged. See 
CGFS (2005), Fitch (2002) and Moody’s (2003).  
86  See Taylor and Goodhart (2004). For a detailed treatment of the issue of the relationship between PDs and pro-
cyclicality, see Cannata (ed.) (2007), BCBS (2005).   36
practice the more cyclical PIT approach is often preferred to the TTC approach.
87 This may be due 
to implementation difficulties (e.g. lack of historical data), and possibly to incentives.
88 Techniques 
of type (i) tend to induce pro-cyclicality because default rates are strongly correlated with cyclical 
conditions (Figure 3.3).
89 The same holds for option-based statistical models, which rely on inputs 
that are themselves characterized by cyclical variability (such as equity volatility, corporate 
leverage and equity prices).
90 Finally, techniques based on mapping of internal grades to external 
ratings suffer from the same problems discussed above for the agency ratings.  
Another potential source of pro-cyclicality is banks’ common failure to re-calibrate PDs 
regularly, but only when the entire system is overhauled – which tends to be associated with 
cyclical fluctuations. Finally, the degree of granularity is generally higher under IRB than SA (15 
rating classes or even more). Borrowers’ migrations across classes over the business cycle are 
therefore likely to be more frequent.  
Figure 3.3  
















































   
Note: The default rate is the 12-month moving average of corporate bonds in default weighted by their nominal amount; data 
for the euro area refer to all non-US corporate bonds (source: Moody’s). GDP growth is the annualized quarterly percentage 
change in GDP (source: Thomson Financial). The shaded areas for the United States are the NBER recession quarters (source 
www.nber.org) and for the euro area are the quarters when the euro area GDP is below its exponential trend 
 
Loss given default (LGD) – As for PD, the Basel II framework requires banks to use prudent (high) 
and a-cyclical LGD estimates, employing data ideally covering at least an entire economic cycle.  
Do losses as a percentage of the amount at risk tend to vary with the cycle? There is solid 
evidence that collateral values and recovery rates on corporate bond defaults fall in economic 
downturns.
91 Evidence for the U.S. market suggests that in recessions bond recovery rates may fall 
up to 25 percentage points from their average non-recession value. Yet the state of the economy 
cannot fully explain the volatility of LGD, which is significantly affected by market and industry-
                                                 
87  Araten et al. (2004) analyze JPMorgan-Chase internal ratings, finding that: (i) ratings are relatively stable at a one-
year horizon but much less so over 2-5-year horizons; (ii) ratings stability is differentiated by rating classes 
(speculative grades show the least stability) and business lines (e.g. investment banking vs. middle market).  
88  Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003) show that profits would be higher if banks adopted ratings that varied over the cycle, 
as such a system would let them transfer the cost of the recession to the rest of the economy. 
89  See Amato and Furfine (2004). 
90  In Merton-type models, estimated default probabilities are correlated positively with a firm’s leverage and equity 
volatility and negatively with its equity price. Given that in recessions stock price volatility is greater (see Panetta et 
al., 2006), leverage increases and stock prices fall (see Section 1), these models are inherently pro-cyclical.   
91  See Altman et al. (2002, 2005), Bakshy et al. (2001), Frye (2000a), and the review in Altman (2006).   37
specific conditions.
92 Evidence for bank loans is limited; the studies done suggest that recovery 
rates are higher in expansions and that the cyclical variations consists in a sharp increase of LGD in 
recessions, not a reduction in upturns.
93 Notice, however, that banks could require additional 
collateral during contractions, thus attenuating the cyclical variations in LGD; this may happen, for 
example, through contractual clauses that allow banks to renegotiate loan conditions. 
Exposures at default (EAD) – While for balance sheet items the EAD is a known value, the AIRB 
approach requires banks to estimate EAD for off-balance-sheet items as well (excluding 
derivatives). The rationale is that borrowers in trouble tend to have greater recourse to unused credit 
facilities, so that banks’ actual exposure in case of default is likely to exceed the current value of the 
loan. Overall, the evidence is scarce and the results not always clear cut, but there would appear to 
be some degree of pro-cyclicality in the actual behaviour of estimated EAD.
94 
Maturity (M) – Because capital requirements are linearly dependent on the maturity of the loan, this 
parameter can also induce pro-cyclical effects. During an economic downturn, exposures become de 
facto less liquid, because borrowers have trouble repaying the loans, say, or because securitization 
becomes more difficult. Besides, banks tend to reschedule loans to counterparties in temporary 
difficulties but with good medium-term growth potential. Both effects lengthen the maturity of the 
loan portfolio, thus increasing capital requirements. 
3.2.3 Macro-prudential risk  
  The foregoing evidence refers to the pro-cyclicality of the capital requirements of individual 
institutions. Brunnermeier et al. (2009), building on ideas similar to those set forth by BIS 
economists (see e.g. Borio, Furfine and Lowe, 2001, Borio and White 2004), emphasize that 
financial crises are not driven just by exogenous shocks but by the interaction between these and 
market dynamics. Hence, regulatory policies should not focus only on the impact on single 
institutions but should fully take account of the risk of an amplifying spiral (whose mechanisms are 
described in Section 1).
95 In the authors’ view, the main problem with Basel II is not an incorrect or 
pro-cyclical assessment of micro-prudential risk (that is, the risk of individual financial institutions) 
but that it ignores (and may even aggravate) macro-prudential risks. As we shall see below, they 
argue that correct measures of macro-prudential risk should be based on indicators of the likelihood 
                                                 
92 Altman et al. (2005) show that the LGD is significantly affected by bond market conditions (e.g. demand for 
defaulted bonds from niche investors). According to Acharya et al. (2003, 2007) industry-specific conditions are also 
relevant (higher LGDs in recessions reflect the increase in the number of distressed business sectors).  
93  See Frye (2000b, c), Carey and Gordy (2004). 
94  The increase in EAD seems to be particularly strong for firms that had better credit ratings prior to default; this might 
reflect the fact that these firms have fewer restrictions and/or covenants or are subject to less stringent monitoring, so 
that when they get in trouble they can draw down their credit line with little objection by the bank. The findings on 
the relationship between EAD and firm characteristics are ambiguous. Finally, the most recent studies suggest that 
loan-specific variables (e.g. commitment size and collateral) may affect EAD, although the effect seems to be 
relatively small. See Allen and Saunders (2002), Asarnow and Marker (1995) Araten and Jacobs (2001), Jacobs 
(2008) and Jiménez et al. (2009).  
95  Brunnermeier et al. (2009) deal extensively with the issue of financial crises. Although strictly speaking this is not 
the same issue as pro-cyclicality, for the practical purposes of this analysis these two concepts overlap. They 
examine several of the weaknesses of regulatory systems focused only on micro-prudential policies. Rather than 
review their analysis, let us clarify their argument by a simple example. Assume a sequence of 50 banks, each of 
which lends to the next one the same amount X that was originally deposited by an external investor in the first bank. 
At each transfer, the maturity of the loan lengthens by one week, and the last bank in the sequence lends the sum to 
an outside investor. The result is that each bank has a small asset-liability mismatch (1 week), but the banking system 
has a much larger mismatch (1 year). Due to the interconnections between banks and the externalities that may arise 
from difficulties at individual banks, this mismatch may represent a non-negligible systemic risk.    38
that a shock to a financial institution will be amplified and subsequently transmitted to the rest of 
the financial system.  
3.3 Empirical evidence on the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements 
Evidence on Basel I – Goodhart et al. (2004) estimate that the introduction of Basel I increased 
capital ratios from 9.5% to more than 13%. Bassett and Zakrajsek (2003) examine the results of the 
US Senior Loan Officer Survey from 1990 to 2003 and find that pressure from regulators (and 
investors) to rebuild capital induced banks to decrease the credit supply in recessions and expand it 
in upturns. Their findings suggest that this pressure may have been more intense after the adoption 
of Basel I. Watanabe (2007) finds a causal nexus between bank capital regulation and the credit 
crunch of the late 1990s in Japan. Montgomery (2005) finds that lending by Japanese banks was 
related to capital ratios in the post-Basel I years (1988-1999) but not earlier (1982-1987).  
A large body of empirical research surveyed  by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS, 1999) shows that the introduction of Basel I was followed by a rise in capital 
ratios in many countries and that pressures on capital may have limited bank lending during the 
cyclical downturns of the early 1990s in the U.S. and the late 1990s in Japan. This evidence fits 
with the thesis that capital regulations may have accentuated the pro-cyclicality of the financial 
system. 
Evidence on Basel II – An empirical assessment of whether Basel II is more pro-cyclical than Basel 
I is problematic, in view of its extremely recent application (in Europe most banks deferred it to 
2008). The scanty evidence available derives from counterfactual and simulation exercises or from 
comparisons with similar past experiences of regulatory change.  
Kashyap and Stein (2004) perform a counterfactual exercise, assuming that Basel II was in 
force during the period 1998-2002. Their simulations suggest that the incremental pro-cyclicality 
associated with Basel II is potentially quite large, although the magnitude depends crucially on the 
credit risk model chosen. A number of other papers find similar results.
96 Repullo et al. (2009) use 
Spanish data to simulate the effect of Basel II assuming point-in-time PDs and find a strong pro-
cyclical effect. Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003) note that more pro-cyclical lending might reflect the 
endogenous response to the new regulation, as profit-maximizing banks may prefer pro-cyclical 
rating schemes.  
In general, banks hold capital in excess of the regulatory minimum.
97 Hence, the pro-
cyclicality of the Basel II capital ratios does not necessarily imply that the actual level of bank 
capital is also pro-cyclical, because the capital buffers that banks hold over and above the minimum 
could enable them to smooth or even eliminate ratio volatility. Heid (2007), in fact, finds that these 
buffers significantly mitigate the effects of the volatility of capital requirements. However, Repullo 
and Suarez (2008), using a calibrated model, emphasize that banks’ choice of level of capital can 
attenuate but not eliminate the inherent pro-cyclicality of the new rules.  
This brief review would appear to confirm that Basel II may increase pro-cyclicality, but 
that this conclusion must be treated with caution. The fact that the type of model used to estimate 
default risk significantly affects the results suggests that the extent of pro-cyclicality in Basel II 
                                                 
96  Goodhart et al. (2004) simulate bank capital charges in the U.S., Mexico and Norway. They conclude that pro-
cyclicality may arise both under the standardized and under the advanced approach. Other contributions are 
summarized in Kashyap and Stein (2004). Several papers confirm that the pro-cyclicality of Basel II depends on the 
credit risk estimation techniques chosen; see Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003), Carling et al. (2002) and Saurina and 
Trucharte (2007). 
97  This may reflect managers’ choices, market discipline or a desire to avoid close supervisory scrutiny (see Taylor and 
Goodhart, 2004).    39
depends at least in part on actual implementation. This conclusion is particularly important, as the 
new rules leave the estimation of risk weights to individual banks, who can opt for either the 
standard or the IRB approach and, within the latter, can choose from different specific models of 
credit risk, with quite different properties in terms of cyclicality. This implies that a greater effort 
should be made to understand the incentives for banks to adopt one model or another.  
3.4 Proposals to contain pro-cyclicality  
The Basel Committee was well aware of the potential pro-cyclical effects of the new 
regulations. The “through the cycle” philosophy that in our view clearly permeates the Accord was 
meant to contain them. Several amendments were introduced specifically in response to this 
problem: the concave risk-weight-PD curve (see Figure 3.1 in the box), which implies that higher 
PD corresponds to lower elasticity of the capital requirement to changes in PD;
98 a moderate slope 
of the curve; the assumption of lower correlations among the PDs of small and medium firms. 
However, as we have seen, banks’ practices have not always corresponded to the spirit of the 
regulation, and overall it seems fair to conclude that Basel II has the potential to generate significant 
pro-cyclicality.  
The pro-cyclicality remaining in the system can always be addressed in the framework of 
the Pillar 2 supervisory review process, one of the most innovative features of Basel II but whose 
potentiality has not yet been fully exploited by supervisors.
99 In fact, under Basel II banks must 
determine the amount of capital needed for current and future risks, including both Pillar 1 risks 
(credit, market, counterparty, operational) and Pillar 2 risks. They must conduct stress tests to gauge 
how their overall risk exposure would be affected by exceptional but plausible adverse events. 
Ongoing supervisory activity could require banks to hold capital buffers over and above those 
needed for Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 risks, in recognition of the outcome of stress testing and possible 
unexpected losses in extremely adverse cyclical conditions. One problem with relying too heavily 
on Pillar 2 is that it generally entails a high degree of supervisory discretionality. In addition to 
introducing possible cross-country differences, this may make proposals along these lines hard to 
enforce in periods of stress.
100   
A number of solutions to reform the Basel II system and contain the pro-cyclicality of 
capital requirements have now been suggested by academics and regulators. While some 
commentators favour radical solutions,
101 most proposals focus on amendments of the current 
framework. A common premise is that the best solution – raising new bank capital in recessions, 
when losses materialize – is hard to implement, because of the capital market imperfections 
                                                 
98   In other words, the increase in capital requirements is less marked for riskier borrowers, which limits capital 
requirements in downturns, when migration towards higher-risk rating classes is more frequent. 
99  The role of the supervisory authorities in Pillar 2 is to ensure that banks have adequate capital to sustain all the risks 
of their business and to push the banks to develop and use better risk monitoring and management techniques. The 
purpose of Pillar 3 (market discipline) is to complement the minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1) and the 
supervisory review process (Pillar 2).  
100  Borrowing from the well known rules vs. discretion debate in monetary policy studies, one could argue that the 
discretion under Pillar 2, while granting flexibility to the regulator, may reduce her degree of commitment and 
induce excess risk-taking by banks, who may expect to be able to rely on ex-post forbearance. 
101  E.g. Di Noia and Micossi (2009) argue that Basel II should be scrapped altogether and replaced by a tight ceiling on 
leverage ratios.   40
discussed in Section 1. Most are relatively simple, which may be a weakness but also a strength.
102 
We now present a critical review of these proposals.
103  
3.4.1 Adjusting for expected losses  
The dynamic provisioning approach – Pioneered by Spain, this approach requires banks to 
accumulate general loss provisions in good times – when credit growth is above trend, credit risk 
increases but impairment losses are low – as a buffer in recessions, when credit decelerates and 
impairment losses surge. The provisions are computed by a relatively simple formula, provided by 
the Bank of Spain, whose inputs are data on current risk-weighted loans and losses experienced in 
previous economic cycles.
104  
While recent experience has shown that dynamic provisioning alone is not sufficient to 
avoid excessive credit growth or episodes of rapid contraction, this system has the advantage of 
simplicity and, if properly calibrated, could guarantee a stable ratio between total provisions and 
total loans.
105 In particular, by linking general provisions to lending growth, it takes account of the 
correlation between credit booms and laxer credit standards. Moreover, because the rule would be 
relatively automatic, the market impact of the provisions would be less negative than the alternative 
of issuing capital in bad times. 
A number of drawbacks have also been pointed out (see e.g. Bank of England, 2008): (i) the 
rule addresses only average losses, not large losses that may occur with a very small probability; (ii) 
it could penalize the more efficient banks, which have above-average lending growth; (iii) like any 
simple rule-based scheme, it would be prone to circumvention (in particular via off-balance-sheet 
transactions and commitments). Objection (i) is a serious one, to be sure, but it could be raised 
against most other proposals just as well. And it should not be pushed too far, insofar as dynamic 
provisioning should complement – not replace – other capital rules, such as the risk-based capital 
regulation of Basel II (which, in principle, should take low-probability events into account) or the 
capital insurance schemes discussed below (which let the banks directly insure against systemic 
events). Objections (ii) and (iii) are correct as far as they go; as Section 4.3 observes, the accounting 
bodies are currently reviewing the rules on consolidation and derecognition. This should help 
address problem (iii).  
                                                 
102  The European Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, Charlie McCreevy, has recently advocated crude 
but simple measures of capital adequacy, arguing that complexity played a significant role in confusing top 
managers, investors and regulators about the risk embodied in the financial products they were dealing with. 
103  Diamond and Rajan (2009) point out that the “market” capital requirement – the level of capitalization that markets 
perceive as adequate – is too low in good times and too high in bad, possibly because of shifting patterns of risk 
appetite through the cycle. This prompts banks to escape stricter regulatory norms in good times through regulatory 
arbitrage, but when bad times come regulatory capital provides little relief, because markets view it as insufficient. 
This represents an important difficulty – which we do not address here – for policies that address pro-cyclicality via 
regulatory capital requirements. 
104  In practice, each bank classifies its loans into six homogeneous risk classes, and performs the following steps for 
each class: (i) the inherent provision (applied on each new loan granted to cover the average credit risk) is computed 
as αjΔCjt, where the coefficient αj measures the loss inherent for risk class j (not individually identified as referred to 
a specific transaction) and ΔCjt is the absolute increase/decrease of the loans recorded by the bank in the reference 
period; (ii) the average specific provision is computed as βj Cjt, where βj is the specific provision over a business 
cycle, common for all banks, and Cjt is the bank’s stock of loans; iii) the provision for the period is computed based 
on the actual impaired loans observed in the period. Then the general provision for each risk class is computed as (i) 
plus (ii) minus (iii). The component (ii) minus (iii) is designed to adjust the provision for the current economic 
circumstances, as it tends to be positive in upswings and negative during recessions. The total general provision is 
computed by adding the general provisions of the six classes. This provision is bounded upward and downward. The 
parameters αj and βj are provided by the Bank of Spain. See Banco de España (2005, p. 73). See also Jiménez and 
Saurina (2006) and Saurina and Trucharte (2007). 
105  See Bank of England (2008); de Larosière et al. (2009) also strongly support this option.    41
A final problem is that, from a technical viewpoint, provisions take the form of value 
adjustments that are registered in the profit and loss account and affect regulatory capital through a 
reduction in total earnings. For this reason, this method has problems of compatibility with 
IAS/IFRS standards, which mandate that only incurred losses can be recorded in the financial 
statements.
106  
The credit value adjustment approach – An alternative to dynamic provisioning would be to modify 
banks’ own funds by introducing, for supervisory purposes only, credit value adjustments (CVA). 
Under this proposal, banks would compute value adjustments on the basis, say, of the deterioration 
in credit quality experienced in downturns, to cover loan losses that are not yet incurred; CVA 
would therefore not affect the profit and loss account.
107 This would reduce the volatility of own 
funds by incorporating in advance the credit value adjustments that are likely to emerge in a 
recession without interfering with current accounting rules.
108 An approach similar to CVA is 
already used in Basel II to set capital requirements for market risk, whereby banks must take into 
account, for regulatory purposes, value adjustments of their trading book portfolio (via a regulatory 
capital reduction);
109 such value adjustments would impact on tier 1 capital but would not show up 
in the accounts.
110 CVA could be computed based on simple rules, such as those used in dynamic 
provisioning schemes. In good times, the mechanism would anticipate the regulatory capital 
reduction because, when a recession occurs and losses materialize, they affect earnings but not 
regulatory capital. 
The advantage of the CVA approach is that it would not affect the accounting standards, as 
the adjustments would be made only for regulatory purposes, and would run in parallel with – and 
independently from – the value adjustments required by IAS, which are based on the “incurred 
losses”. Its drawbacks would otherwise be similar to those of dynamic provisioning.  
The approaches described in this sub-section could reduce pro-cyclicality by stabilizing 
regulatory capital. However, they would have no effect on the pro-cyclicality induced by ratings. 
This issue is addressed in the next sub-section. 
3.4.2 Adjusting for unexpected losses 
A first group of proposals are designed to contain the pro-cyclicality of the Basel II 
requirements by smoothing the variations of the inputs of the capital function (PD, LGD, EAD, M) 
over time. Conservative parameter estimates could be used in good times, to reduce the necessary 
                                                 
106  However, the issue is still open. According to the Bank of Spain, dynamic provisioning could be made compatible 
with the current accounting framework, as it mandates that banks set aside provisions for losses that in practice have 
already been incurred (from an economic and statistical perspective, since the model is backward looking) but 
simply not yet matched with individual loans.  
107 CVA might be considered as a proxy of expected losses during a recession, after deduction of incurred losses 
recorded in the profit and loss account. Unexpected losses should instead be covered by capital requirements. 
108  The measure proposed would work as follows. Suppose the bank’s regulatory capital at time T1 is equal to 100 and 
the credit value adjustment equal to 10 is introduced. The measure would lower capital to 90 at T1, with no impact 
on the profit and loss account. When a recession occurs and losses materialize, the CVA would absorb the losses, 
offsetting the negative impact on total earnings; the bank’s capital would remain unchanged at 90. This would 
moderate the recession-induced volatility of capital. 
109  To take into account that, under exceptional conditions, banks may be unable to sell or hedge positions, the Basel 
regulation mandates that they make downward valuation adjustments/reserves for these less liquid positions, and 
that they review the appropriateness on an on-going basis. Further, the Basel text states that “close-out prices for 
concentrated positions and/or stale positions should be considered in establishing those valuations 
adjustments/reserves for less liquid positions”.  
110 A similar scheme was used prior to the adoption of IAS/IFRS by the Bank of Italy, which required banks to 
calculate, for regulatory purposes, value adjustments of the loans portfolio due to country risk.     42
adjustments in recessions.
111 As we have seen, the regulations already promote this approach. Thus, 
the common denominator of these proposals is the intention of reducing banks’ discretionality in 
estimation. A second group of proposals focus on the output of the capital function. For example, 
the multiplying factor, which is fixed at 1.06 (see equation 1 in the box), could vary counter-
cyclically.
112 Alternatively, capital requirements could be allowed to change gradually, for example 
by varying them in an autoregressive fashion.  
Repullo et al. (2009) compare these methods using simulations with Spanish data. They find 
that the best countercyclical properties are obtained by smoothing the output of the capital function 
using an adjustment factor that depends on the deviation of GDP growth from its long-run average. 
Adjustment factors based on credit growth or stock market returns yield worse results than 
smoothing the inputs. 
These proposals can help avoid abrupt changes of capital requirements due to business 
fluctuations. One possible drawback is that rules based on uniform smoothing for different banks 
would penalize the more prudent ones (this would be the case for the proposal to smooth the 
constant factor of the capital function). Carefully drafted rules should therefore be bank-specific and 
take into account the extent to which banks already rate their customers through the cycle.
113 
However, there remains the question of how far banks, anticipating the effects of the rule, could 
manage to circumvent them, e.g. by appropriately modifying other aspects of the capital function 
that are discretional or hard to monitor for the supervisor. 
3.4.3 Adjusting for macro-prudential risks 
The proposals described so far would help contain the pro-cyclicality of lending at the micro 
level but leave the system vulnerable at the macro level. Two proposals address this issue. The idea 
is to adjust banks’ capital requirements in response to early signals of macroeconomic instability.  
Goodhart and Persaud (2008a) propose to link capital requirements to the rate of expansion 
of bank lending and to asset prices in the relevant sectors. For example, capital requirements for 
mortgage lending “… could be linked to the rise in both mortgage lending and housing prices”.
114 
This mechanism (which could well be part of Pillar 2 within the Basel framework) would penalize 
excessive credit growth and limit pro-cyclical effects by building buffers in booms. Coupled with a 
sufficiently low floor under capital adequacy requirements (the authors mention 3%) it would 
permit stimulating lending in downturns. The limitations of the proposal, acknowledged by the 
authors themselves, are similar to (ii) and (iii) discussed above for dynamic provisioning (potential 
penalization of efficient banks and circumvention via off-balance-sheet items). In our view, the 3% 
floor on capital requirements could be too low, but adoption of a higher floor would not alter the 
rationale of the proposal. The implementation would require addressing a series of practical 
difficulties (e.g. which macro variables to consider and how to combine them, especially for cross-
border banks). 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) argue that since both micro-prudential regulation and measures 
of macro-prudential risk have strengths and weaknesses, the two approaches should be combined. 
                                                 
111  For example, banks could increase the conservatism of their estimates in good times by considering, for each rating 
class, the upper bound and not the central value of the PD. Another possibility would be, in good times, to shift 
borrowers into higher risk classes on the basis of the estimated worsening of their PDs in recession (de facto 
downgrading them). 
112  See Gordy and Howells (2006). 
113  For example, PDs could be modified so that the adjustment would be small or negligible for intermediaries already 
adopting prudent TTC estimates and comparatively sharp for PIT raters. 
114  Goodhart and Persaud (2008b) suggest linking credit growth to the inflation target, the growth of potential output 
plus an additional factor taking into account structural changes in the ratio of bank assets to GDP.   43
Specifically, capital requirements of financial institutions should be linked to measures that capture 
risk spillovers, that is the risk that problems at one bank could cause systemic instability. To this 
end, the basic capital ratio of Basel II should be multiplied by a macro-prudential risk spillover 
factor, computed on the basis of leverage, maturity mismatch, credit and asset price expansion. This 
spillover factor would generate significant additional capital requirements for institutions that may 
originate or propagate instability (due e.g. to size or interconnections), whereas it would have a 
negligible effect for non-systemically relevant banks.
115 Also, it would entail higher capital 
requirements in boom periods, and vice-versa in downturns.  
As argued by the authors, this proposal is in many respects similar to dynamic provisioning 
(although the accounting impact is different as it does not affect loan loss reserves) and as such it 
shares many of its virtues and caveats. Its higher level of sophistication permits to take into account 
the complex interaction between lending standards, credit growth and other relevant variables. The 
main strength of the proposal is that it takes into consideration the potential instability arising from 
large and complex financial institutions, whose opacity magnifies agency problems between 
managers and shareholders, hampering or even impeding efficient risk management and adequate 
monitoring by external investors, with adverse consequences for the financial system at large.
116 
But the complexity of the proposal may also be seen as a weakness, as its implementation, and 
supervision, could be difficult. One may wonder whether the same objective could be achieved via 
simpler criteria, based primarily on the size of intermediaries and maybe on a few other key 
variables, such as those pointed out by Brunnermeier et al. (2009).  
3.4.4 Contingent capital 
In the proposals discussed above, the capital needed to withstand adverse shocks and 
stimulate lending in recession is generated exclusively by banks’ internal resources. An alternative 
set of proposals relies on external resources: the idea is to use hybrid instruments, with both 
insurance and financing components, to provide capital to large firms (not necessarily in the 
financial sector). These proposals have been motivated on the grounds of efficiency, but in our view 
the real common denominator is their reliance on external insurance, whereas the proposals 
illustrated in the previous sub-sections focus on self-insurance. Specific proposals, which include 
contingent capital, catastrophe bonds and options, have been advanced by re-insurers but have not 
been widely implemented (Rochet, 2008). 
Capital insurance – Kashyap et al. (2008) suggest that banks should stipulate insurance contracts 
that would pay off in states of the world, such as  a systemic crisis, involving a shortage of bank 
capital. To make the contract default-proof, the insurer (e.g. a pension fund or a sovereign wealth 
fund) should put the potential pay-off in a custodial account upon signing the contract.  
Though not without intellectual appeal, this proposal may be hard to implement. First of all, 
Rochet (2008) notes that imposing a 100% collateral deposit could be too demanding, and suggests 
that the role of insurer should be taken up by the State, which can promote intergenerational risk-
                                                 
115  The authors propose to adopt the CoVaR measure proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) which, unlike the 
VaR, also captures the links across several institutions. To address the well-known pro-cyclicality of such 
methodologies (due to the fact that in boom periods volatilities are low, and vice-versa) the authors propose that 
estimates be based primarily on past “crisis data”, underweighting recent data. 
116    According to some commentators, the ongoing crisis is to some extent a crisis of the (excessively) large and 
complex financial conglomerates that have emerged from the consolidation wave of the last 15 years. For example, 
Wolf (2009) argues that “We are painfully learning that the world’s mega-banks are too complex to manage, too big 
to fail and too hard to restructure”; see also Partnoy (2009). For an in-depth analysis of the weak relationship 
between M&As, size and efficiency in the banking sector see Pilloff and Santomero (1998 ) and Amel et. al. (2004).   44
sharing.
117 Problems would still remain, though. Such a contract is likely to be very expensive 
(banks might well be reluctant to subscribe it)
118 and complex (banks should subscribe staggered 
insurance policies with many counterparties, with possibly complicated triggers for the payments). 
If such a scheme were mandatory, it is not clear how it could be correctly priced, especially if the 
insurer were the State. Finally, the State’s inability to commit not to rescue banks that did not 
purchase any insurance would strongly limit banks’ incentives for such coverage.
119 
Reverse convertibles – Capital insurance resembles earlier proposals relying on reverse convertible 
securities. Banks could issue bonds automatically converted into common stock if the issuer’s share 
price falls below a given threshold (Flannery, 2005). The main problem is that the firm-specific 
trigger mechanism would be subject to moral hazard. This problem could be overcome by a trigger 
mechanism not within the issuer’s control, such as a broad index of bank equities. Like capital 
insurance, this non-standard reverse convertible would provide bank capital overnight in case of a 
systemic crisis. Its other advantages would be simplicity and liquidity (these securities could be 
traded, and hence priced through market forces), which would presumably translate into relatively 
low costs.  
3.4.5 Target leverage ratios   
Limits on leverage – defined as the ratio between total bank assets (not weighted for risk) and 
capital – could represent a complementary solution to the foregoing proposals. Target leverage 
ratios can be considered as an insurance against the failure of the complex models used to assess 
credit risk and compute capital requirements. As such, they could address micro- as well as macro-
prudential risks.
120 
The main advantage of this class of rules is that they would directly affect leverage, a key 
factor in the pro-cyclicality and instability of the financial system, as should be clear from our 
discussion of the New Financial Accelerator mechanism in Section 1. For containing macro-
prudential risks, leverage caps could help if solutions based on capital or contingent rules turned out 
to be too costly or difficult to implement (the experience regarding other instruments providing 
insurance against certain types of systemic risk, such as longevity bonds, is not encouraging; see 
Blake, Cairns and Dowd, 2008, Visco, 2008). From a micro-prudential perspective, caps would 
likely prove useful to prevent capital from falling too low in upturns, especially when hidden risks 
(e.g. the model risk inherent in the Basle II framework) are particularly elevated.  
One drawback of leverage caps is that because total assets (the numerator of the ratio) are 
risk-invariant, banks would have an incentive to invest in more risky assets; however this would not 
be a problem if the rule, as it seems reasonable, were to complement the Basel framework. A 
second problem is the apparent simplicity of the rule. Indeed, while measures of leverage based on 
                                                 
117 Rochet (2008) notes that this proposal would eliminate insolvency risk and permit issuing liquidity ex post, thus 
avoiding its waste in the states of the world when it would not be needed. 
118 Kashyap et al. (2008) implicitly assume that the cost of capital insurance would be lower than that of holding extra 
capital. However, given its characteristics, the contract would appear likely to be very expensive (as it would be 
illiquid, would pay off in bad states of the world and would be linked to systemic risk, which cannot be diversified).  
119 Pedersen and Roubini (2009) propose that each bank should be required to pay an insurance policy against its 
systemic risk. In contrast to Kashyap et al. (2008), here in case of pay-off on the insurance, the payment would not 
go to the company but to the regulator responsible for stabilizing the financial system. This would reduce moral 
hazard and give each bank the incentive to contain its systemic risk (to lower the insurance premium), but the cost of 
such policy and the difficulty of pricing would likely be non-negligible. Perotti and Suarez (2009) present an 
insurance-type proposal which focuses on liquidity risk. The proposal is aimed at correcting problems stemming 
from maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities, in the spirit advocated by Persaud (2008); see section 4.3.  
120 The Basel Committee on Banking supervision seems oriented towards considering instruments of this class as an 
important complement to risk-based regulation. See Wellink (2009).    45
balance sheet data are easy to compute, they may nonetheless be difficult to interpret and compare 
across banks, especially cross-border. Proper measures of leverage should be robust to:
121 (i) the 
accounting treatment of off-balance-sheet operations and implicit commitments (see Section 4.3); 
(ii) the treatment of derivatives and hedges (a firm could modify its leverage through derivatives); 
(iii) the treatment of leverage embedded in structured finance products (e.g. subordinated tranches 
of ABS). Ceilings to leverage must also take account of different business models (e.g. retail vs. 
wholesale), which entail different levels of risk and therefore of sustainable leverage. They can also 
be used as active supervisory instruments. For example, in Canada leverage caps are set at the 
individual institution level, taking into account factors such as operating and management 
experience, earnings, asset diversification, etc.. The standard limit is 20, but for certain institutions, 
e.g. start-up banks, it can be set as low as 5.
122  
Leverage caps have been imposed in various countries,
123 and there is some evidence of 
their effectiveness. Armstrong et al. (2009), commenting on the Canadian experience, argue that the 
ceiling has moderated pro-cyclical pressures, contributing to the resiliency of Canadian banks to the 
effects of the crisis. Blundell-Wignall et al. (2008) argue that until 2004 U.S. broker-dealers were 
subject to stringent supervisory rules limiting the maximum debt to net equity ratio to 15:1. 
Afterwards, investment banks could agree voluntarily to SEC consolidated oversight (not just 
broker dealer activities), but with less stringent rules that allowed them to increase their leverage 
ratio to 40:1 in some cases (the increase is clearly visible in Figure 1.4.A in Section 1). The related 
SEC document mentions that the new voluntary regime required computing group-wide capital and 
risks in accordance with the Basel Standards. This evidence, albeit indirect, is in line with the view 
that caps on leverage may usefully complement the standard risk-based approach. In a similar vein, 
Hildebrand (2008) notes that the two major Swiss banks were among the best capitalized in the 
world in terms of risk-based measures, but among the worst capitalized in terms of simple leverage. 
He argues that, with the benefit of hindsight, more emphasis should have been put on the risks of 
excessive leverage. 
Like the other mechanisms discussed above, leverage limits could be manoeuvred in 
countercyclical fashion. Borio et al. (2001) discuss the advantages and the difficulties of doing so, 
not only for leverage caps, but also for loan to value ratios, and supervisory instruments in general. 
They argue that adjustment should be made infrequently, and only when there is evidence that 
serious financial imbalances are developing. The interaction between monetary policy and active 
countercyclical management of supervisory instruments could warrant further study. 
 
                                                 
121  See Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRMPG, 1999, 2008). CRMPG (1999) argues that no single 
definition captures all aspects of leverage, and that leverage should not be viewed as an independent risk factor, but 
rather as a potential amplifier of market risk, funding liquidity risk and asset liquidity risk. In spite of its critical 
attitude, CRMPG (2008) acknowledges that leverage ratios provide useful information and cannot be dismissed out 
of hand in the light of the current crisis. 
122  See Armstrong et al. (2009). 
123    Caps were imposed since the early eighties on banks and other deposit-taking institutions in Canada, and on 
commercial banks in the U.S.. Similar limits have been adopted in Switzerland in 2008.   46
4. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS  
In the last decade banks – in particular the large, international banks – diversified their 
functions away from the traditional intermediation model. They decoupled the lending functions by 
originating loans and selling them to outside investors. On the funding side they diversified sources, 
increasing the share of the wholesale component and reducing that of traditional deposits. Financial 
services to the corporate and household sectors have increased substantially; in many European 
countries banks own much of the asset management industry. As a result, in the U.S. the non-
interest income has increased from 20% of total income at the beginning of the 1980s to around 
45%. Similar growth patterns hold in Europe.  
The increased exposure of bank profits to market volatility – in particular the greater role of 
capital gains and losses – has altered the information needed to assess banks’ performance, 
contributing to the shift from cost accounting – booking assets at purchase price or origination value 
– to fair value accounting (FVA) – marking assets and liabilities to market.  
As decisions are based on the information available, changes in accounting standards may 
influence the financial system by affecting investment choices, managers’ incentives and firm 
behaviour. In this section, after reviewing the main features of FVA, we focus on how accounting 
standards affect pro-cyclicality. We conclude by examining the main policy suggestions. 
4.1 Main features of fair value accounting  
The gradual shift from historical cost accounting (HCA) to fair value accounting has been 
prompted by the new financial environment characterized by the greater importance of capital 
markets, rapid financial innovation, and market-based risk management. The change has been led 
by the two main accounting bodies worldwide, the United States Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), responsible for two 
distinct accounting standards (U.S. GAAP and IAS/IFRS, respectively). IAS/IFRS were widely 
adopted starting in January 2005, when the EU made them applicable for listed companies 
(Commission Regulation No. 1606/2002). IAS are now used in more than a hundred countries. In 
what follows we will mostly illustrate general principles widely shared by the two systems. Some 
important but technical distinctions will be addressed in the final section. 
The main innovation of the new accounting rules is the standard of fair value, defined as the 
amount for which an instrument “could be exchanged between knowledgeable, willing parties in an 
arm’s length transaction”. For actively traded instruments, this is the market price (mark-to-market 
accounting). In the absence of a quoted price in an active market, the holder of the instrument must 
use a valuation technique (mark-to-model accounting).
124 Both IAS/IFRS and GAAP contain a 
hierarchy of inputs for determining fair value, from the most to the least reliable: Level 1 assets 
(marked directly to market), Level 2 assets (priced using comparable instruments or models with 
observable inputs) and Level 3 assets (marked to model, for instruments that have very thin markets 
or are not traded at all; this group includes almost all structured products, such as ABSs and CDOs). 
The second major novelty is that the accounting rule applicable to any instrument depends 
chiefly on whether the intention is to sell it or hold it to maturity. The rationale is that since a 
financial instrument can be held for different purposes, there must be a close link between its 
                                                 
124
  Valuation techniques must incorporate all the factors that market participants would consider in setting a price, 
minimizing entity-specific inputs.   47
valuation and its role in asset/liability management.
125 Table 4.1 shows the classes envisaged by the 
IASB and the related accounting criteria. The instruments classified as HTM, which the 
management will hold to maturity, are measured at amortised cost, and changes in their value do not 
affect the balance sheet or the profit and loss account, unless the instruments are impaired.
126 The 
same goes for loans and receivables (L&R). The instruments recorded at fair value are those 
classified as held for trading, fair value option, or available for sale. For the HFT and FVO 
portfolios, unrealized changes in fair value affect the balance sheet and the income statement; for 
the AFS portfolio they are recognised in a component of equity, the AFS reserve, and affect the 
income statement only if the asset is impaired.  
In general, once a financial instrument is allocated to a given portfolio, under IFRS firms 
have limited opportunities to transfer it. In particular, instruments cannot be reclassified into or out 
of the fair value through profit and loss portfolios.
127 Because of the current financial crisis, this rule 
has now been amended.
128 Obviously, the switch to FVA significantly increased the portion of 
assets and liabilities recorded at market value, including derivatives, which had often been booked 
at cost.  
A number of other important changes brought about by FVA may also have an impact on 
financial sector pro-cyclicality: 
(i)  Increased discretionality – Fair value has increased banks’ discretional choices in representing 
their accounting situation. The recent crisis has shown that this can be crucial in times of stress, 
because it may reduce comparability of balance sheets, indirectly increasing opacity and making 
valuations more uncertain. 
a.  In principle, two banks holding identical assets and liabilities could choose different 
accounting representations, reflecting classification choices based on different holding 
intent. 
b.  Accounting rules provide only generic indications about the mark-to-model application of 
FVA (e.g. for level 3 assets), and the related disclosure levels. In practice the models differ 
widely. There is evidence that in the current crisis a major role was played by the 
difficulty of assessing the risk and the market value of complex securities.
129  
c.  Certain accounting prescriptions are open to differing interpretations by different 
intermediaries. This can lead to a wide dispersion of estimated values for similar 
instruments. Among the numerous examples,
130 one that is potentially relevant to pro-
                                                 
125  For instance, if an investor intends to hold a fixed-rate long-term bond to maturity, then booking valuation changes 
due to interest rate fluctuations may generate unnecessary volatility in the accounts. 
126    A financial asset is impaired and impairment losses are incurred only if: (i) there is objective evidence of 
impairment as a result of a “loss event” occurring subsequent to the initial recognition of the asset; (ii) the loss event 
has a reliably estimated impact on the future cash flows of the asset. 
127  Under the so-called “tainting rule”, if more than an insignificant amount of HTM instruments are reclassified or 
sold, then all HTM assets must be reclassified and the HTM portfolio cannot be used for two years. 
128  The amendment (passed by the IASB in October 2008 to bring its framework closer to GAAP) allows financial 
institutions to reclassify assets from fair value to amortized cost and from HFT to AFS under “particular 
circumstances”, sparing them from posting heavy losses and further depleting capital. 
129  See Senior Supervisors Group (2008). Perraudin and Wu (2008) show that the pricing of ABS of various degrees of 
seniority broke down during the turmoil. As a result, no one really knows the true value of these instruments. Clerc 
(2008) notes that the use of ABX indices for the pricing of ABS, common before the crisis, has now been shown to 
have serious weaknesses. 
130  Consider the following: (i) the regulation uses the concepts of “active market” and “distress sale”, but does not 
define them rigorously. In the recent crisis, market participants had no guidance about when they could move from a 
mark-to-market to a mark-to-model approach, and had to make subjective judgments (Matherat, 2008); (ii) under 
FAS 115, if impairment is deemed “other than temporary” it must be recognized in the profit and loss account, but   48
cyclicality is the classification of instruments as held for trading: an asset or liability may 
be put in the HFT portfolio if “it is acquired or incurred principally for the purpose of 
selling or repurchasing it in the near term”. But “near term” is not specifically defined.  
 
Table 4.1: Accounting classes in the IAS/IFRS 
 Accounting  method:  Accounting 
classification  Assets/liabilities categories 




o loans & receivables (L&R): non-derivative 
financial assets with fixed or determinable 
payments that are not listed in active markets 
(b) 
o held to maturity (HTM): non-derivative 
financial assets with fixed or determinable 
payments and fixed maturity that the company 
has the intention and ability to hold to maturity 
  
 




Not marked to 
market, unless 
impaired 




o available for sale (AFS): non-derivative 
financial assets that are not included in the 
previous categories. 
 
  Fair value; change in 
fair value recorded in 
AFS reserves 
  Not marked to 
market, unless 
impaired 
At fair value 
through profit 
and loss 
o held for trading (HFT): financial 
assets/liabilities acquired/incurred for the 
purpose of selling/repurchasing them in the near 
term or assets/liabilities that are part of a 
portfolio managed together and for which there 
is evidence of a recent actual pattern of short-
term profit-taking; derivative instruments are 
included in this portfolio, except for effective 
hedging instruments.  
o Fair value option (FVO): financial 
assets/liabilities designated by the holder as at 
fair value through profit or loss since doing so 
results in more relevant information (e.g. 
elimination or reduction of an accounting 
mismatch) or allows the holder to value a hybrid 














Notes. (a) The amortised cost of a financial asset is the amount at which the asset is measured at initial recognition minus principal repayments, plus 
or minus the cumulative amortisation of any difference between that initial amount and the maturity amount (using the effective interest method) 
and minus any reduction for impairment. (b) Under U.S. GAAP loans may be classified as either “held-for-sale” (carried at lower of cost or market 
value), “held-for-investment” (at amortised cost), “fair value option” (fair value). – (c) An embedded derivative is a derivative that is part of a 
hybrid (combined) instrument that includes a non-derivative host contract (e.g. a debt or equity instrument). IAS 39 generally requires embedded 
derivatives to be separated from the host contract if the risk and economic characteristics of embedded derivatives are not closely related to the host 
contract. Because the steps needed for assuring compliance with these requirements can be complex or result in less reliable measures than 
measuring the entire instrument at fair value, IAS 39 permits the entire instrument to be designated as at fair value through profit or loss.  
 
d.  Under FVA, hedging instruments (derivatives) are always carried at fair value through 
profit and loss. The valuation of the hedged item depends on whether or not the hedge is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the meaning of the expression is highly subjective (JPMorgan, 2008); (iii) to classify an asset as HTM the firm 
“must have intention and ability to hold it to maturity”, but of course that ability may come under strain in a crisis.    49
“highly effective”.
131 If it is, the hedged item is also valued at fair value with reference to 
the hedged risk (e.g. interest rate risk), whereas the remaining portion can be valued using 
different criteria (e.g. amortized cost).
132 If it is not, the bank can evaluate the hedged 
asset/liability in two ways: (a) use an alternative valuation method (e.g. amortized cost), 
which, however, would create asymmetries and reduce the quality and transparency of the 
accounts; (b) use the fair value option for all the risks of the asset/liability, not only the 
risk that is hedged; however, this may force the bank to resort to estimates and to 
excessively expand the share of its assets/liabilities valued at FV.
133 This is a most 
important if technical issue, to which we return below. 
(ii)  Prohibition on recording “generic costs” – Prior to IAS/IFRS, during good times many 
intermediaries used to enter “generic costs” in the financial statements – such as larger-than-
necessary loan impairment losses or provisions against “hypothetical liabilities” – as a cushion for 
bad times. These practices are no longer permitted: loan losses cannot be recorded unless 
impairment losses are actually incurred. The justification for this prohibition is that these “generic 
costs” unduly increase management discretionality and reduce account transparency.
134 In 
particular, accountants argue that setting up a provision when the loan is granted (say) implies that 
the loan is priced below its face value, as risk of credit losses should already be factored into the 
interest rate (Viñals, 2004). For these reasons, with FVA retaining earnings is the only feasible way 
to create a reserve buffer.  
(iii)   Treatment of risks – The historical cost criterion provided for no accounting treatment of 
risks except the recording of impairment losses, so the switch to FVA represented a major 
improvement. The approach is implicit but comprehensive: by stating that the valuation should be 
the “market price” (real or estimated), the fair value principle mandates that all risks be covered in 
the valuation. This all-inclusiveness makes the criterion very powerful, but not completely 
foolproof. Considering the mark-to-market application of FV, for instance, it is obvious that any 
bias incorporated into market prices will carry over to accounting valuations.  
The issue of risk treatment is closely related to item ii (generic costs): under FVA, provisions 
against generic business risks cannot be accumulated
135; the only possible source of such a 
provision is retained earnings. 
(iv)  Treatment of liabilities – FVA is typically applied to a significant portion of the assets side, 
but even though IFRS allows booking liabilities at fair value under certain conditions, liabilities are 
still mostly carried at cost. As a direct consequence, changes in interest rates affect banks’ assets 
and liabilities symmetrically, but only the impact on assets is recorded in the accounts. 
                                                 
131  According to IAS 39, a hedging relationship is highly effective if the hedge is expected to work through the entire 
lifespan of the hedged item, and the ratio between the loss/gain on the hedge and the corresponding gain/loss on the 
hedged item is within a range of 80-125%.  
132 For example, consider a retail mortgage whose interest rate risk is covered by a highly effective hedge (via an 
interest rate swap, IRS), but the credit risk part is not. Then the IRS and the interest rate risk component of the 
mortgage are at FV, but the credit risk component could be valued at, say, amortized cost. 
133  Consider the example of the previous footnote, but assume that the hedge is not highly effective. Under option (a) 
the bank will use fair value for the IRS and amortized cost for the mortgage. Fluctuations in the market value of the 
IRS will then show up in the accounts, even though they are simply offsetting the corresponding fluctuations of the 
mortgage interest rate. Under option (b), the bank must adopt fair value for both the interest rate risk and the credit 
risk component of the mortgage. The former is easy to calculate, since the price of the IRS is readily observable, but 
the latter component may be problematic. 
134    Generic provisions reduce earnings; this may serve proper but also improper purposes (tax elusion, profit 
smoothing, creating a smokescreen on the real economic and financial condition of a company). 
135  A provision has to be recognised only if a firm has an obligation that can be reliably estimated and is likely to 
generate an outflow of resources. See IAS 37 “Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets”.   50
(v)  Treatment of goodwill
136 – Under historical cost accounting, the buying firm could write the 
value of goodwill among its assets, and amortize it over a certain number of years. Under 
IAS/IFRS, goodwill is considered in practice an indefinite life asset and is therefore no longer 
amortized but must be subjected to annual impairment tests. Losses are recorded directly in the 
income statement as well as on the balance sheet.  
4.2 How Fair Value Accounting Affects Pro-cyclicality  
There is broad agreement that FVA, in particular IAS39, increases the pro-cyclicality of the 
financial sector (see e.g. Taylor and Goodhart, 2004, and Banque de France, 2008).  
The main point is that changes in the prices of financial assets recorded at FV are reflected 
immediately in banks’ balance sheets (HFT, FVO and AFS categories) and profit and loss accounts 
(only the first two categories), regardless of whether or not they are realized. Since asset prices are 
pro-cyclical (see Section 1), the expansion of balance sheets during booms and their contraction in 
downturns are sharper than under historical cost accounting. The current crisis shows how this 
mechanism works in reverse in a downturn: the immediate recording of fair value reduction on 
assets reduces banks’ capital base, hence their lending and their demand for securities; and this in 
turn feeds back onto economic activity.
137 
FVA may also prompt pro-cyclical behaviour of balance sheets indirectly, through its effect 
on the demand for assets. In Section 1 we discussed a sale externality reinforcing the New Financial 
Accelerator (NFA): agent A’s sale of an asset depresses the price and so affects the balance sheet 
and profitability of agent B, who holds the same or a similar asset. Plantin, et al. (2008a), (2008b) 
point out that mark-to-market strengthens this effect: a bank manager with short-term incentives 
will be tempted to pre-empt the fall in price by selling the asset itself, amplifying the price fall; and 
conversely during upswings.  
Other features of FVA described in section 4.1 may also increase financial sector pro-
cyclicality. We refer to them using the same numbering: 
(i)    Increased discretionality – In section 1 we argued that reduced liquidity may magnify the 
effects of the NFA mechanism. The increased discretionality brought about by FVA may have 
aggravated the uncertainty of valuations and so reduced market liquidity. This is likely the case for 
complex products, which are generally Level 3 assets; it is not surprising that investors and 
financial analysts, in the absence of specific information, have tended to see large holdings of level 
3 assets held by a bank as a signal of fragility.
138  
(i.c)    Securities held for trading, (i.d) treatment of hedges – As we have seen, the regulation does 
not specifically define when an instrument meets or fails to meet the criteria for inclusion in the 
HFT portfolio. The crisis has revealed that, in many cases, assets that were not intended to be sold 
quickly were reclassified as HFT. While there is no hard evidence on what led banks to make these 
choices, presumably the urge to post short-term gains on the underlying securities played a part. 
Regardless of the motivations, these valuation choices contributed to an excessive increase in the 
share of assets assigned to the HFT portfolio.  
                                                 
136  Goodwill represents the premium that the acquirer of a firm pays over the fair value of all assets minus liabilities.  
137  The simulations in Enria et al. (2004) suggest that, under full FVA, a “typical” real estate crisis would lead to a 
3.2% fall in bank assets and a 54% fall in capital and reserves. This compares to 1.6% and 26%, respectively, under 
the old accounting regime. 
138  For example, in 2007 almost one fifth of Citigroup’s financial instruments measured at fair value through profit or 
loss (trading portfolio, fair value option and derivatives) consisted of Level 3 assets (see the Citigroup Annual 
Report for 2007).   51
A similar mechanism is at work in the treatment of hedges that fail the “highly effective” test. In 
practice, banks often chose to value at fair value (FVO) all the risks of the hedged item, resorting to 
estimation techniques. This is partly due to the fact that the obligation to value ineffective hedging 
derivatives at FV, in the HFT portfolio, would have otherwise created fictitious profits or losses: it 
would make little economic sense recording in the income statement a variation in the value of the 
derivative and neglecting the variation of the underlying asset valued at cost, since the derivative 
was acquired precisely to offset the latter. Regardless of the effectiveness of the hedge, in some 
cases banks simply chose not to apply hedge accounting to avoid its high costs (in terms of 
complexity of the documentation and computational burden of assessing the effectiveness of the 
hedge).  
Both these factors – excessive use of the HFT portfolio and of the FVO for hedged instruments – 
inflated the share of instruments valued at fair value through profit or loss: on the basis of 2007 
consolidated annual reports, this share reached 50% at some major banks, and with peaks exceeding 
70%, far above the system average. Clearly this magnified the impact of the crisis on balance 
sheets, and thus intensified the NFA mechanism.  
(ii)    Prohibition on recording “generic costs” – The prohibition on building up generic reserves as 
a cushion for bad times clearly increases pro-cyclicality. As we have seen, this prohibition is a 
source of tensions between accountants and regulators.  
(iii)  Treatment of risks – Similar considerations apply to changes in fair value, which are barred 
under the implicit treatment of risks under FVA. Such treatment of risks is an additional source of 
pro-cyclicality because, as we have seen, FVA endorses market estimates of risks, which are 
accentuated in downturns (see Section 3.2.2). Thus, during buoyant growth marking-to-market will 
generate overoptimistic valuations, and conversely during downswings. And with the benefit of 
hindsight it is now clear that certain risks were grossly underestimated; the list includes liquidity 
risk, but also, for Level 3 assets, model, input, data and parameter uncertainty.
139 The 
underestimation of such risks, especially liquidity, certainly amplified the pro-cyclicality of the 
treatment of risks during the crisis. 
(iv)    Treatment of liabilities – The fact that liabilities are still mostly valued at cost increases pro-
cyclicality, as profits tend to increase in booms and decline in slumps more than they would under 
symmetrical FVA treatment of assets and liabilities (recall from Section 1 that the NFA is triggered 
by a shock to bank assets with liabilities values fixed).  
(v)    Treatment of goodwill – Although goodwill is deducted from supervisory capital, changes in 
its valuation under FVA may contribute significantly to the expansion and contraction of the 
balance sheet, with a twofold effect on pro-cyclicality: (a) since M&As are clearly pro-cyclical, 
their expansive impact on the aggregate assets of financial institutions during upswings will be 
strong, and conversely in slumps; (b) in bad times, impairment testing will cause losses on goodwill 
to emerge, unless the initial accounting was done very conservatively.  
The above is a non-exhaustive list of the ways in which FVA may affect pro-cyclicality. For 
instance, it has been argued that FVA may have enhanced perverse incentives, fostering herding 
(Gorton et al. 2006) and short-termism (see Viñals 2008). Incentives are dealt with in Section 5 
below. The role of FVA should not be overemphasized, though. While there is undoubtedly some 
truth in these arguments, it is important to distinguish the pro-cyclicality induced by FVA from the 
effects of business practices based on mark-to-market as such, which were widespread well before 
FVA was introduced. Several examples come to mind: (a) Caruana and Pazarbasioglu (2008) argue 
that in the run-up to the crisis liquidity risk was not fully taken into account, so part of the recorded 
                                                 
139 See Viñals (2008), Clerc (2008).    52
profit actually represented liquidity risk premia that should have been provisioned. The issue 
certainly needs to be addressed (we return on it in the next section), but in any case the 
underestimation of liquidity risk can hardly be ascribed to FVA. (b) The pro-cyclical effect of 
"margin calls" reflects the market valuation of financial instruments, irrespective of the accounting 
criterion used. (c) FVA is sometimes blamed for the widespread adoption of automatic decision-
making rules that amplify price spirals (e.g. stop-loss rules, linked automatically to the prices of 
financial instruments), but these became common not with FVA but with the advent of 
computerized trading. (d) The growth of off-balance-sheet vehicles (SIVs, conduits, etc.) – usually 
characterized by high leverage, significant maturity mismatches and financed with credit lines by 
sponsor banks – increases pro-cyclicality, since banks are more likely to create SIVs when asset 
prices increase (because they are more likely to get good ratings and place ABCPs among 
investors). However, SIVs existed well before FVA; their expansion in recent years is probably due 
to the desire of banks to avoid capital charges and to the growth of securitization activity. (e) Day-
one booking of profits has also been criticized. Under this rule, day-one profits – the difference 
between the estimated fair value of an instrument when the transaction is entered into and the price 
of the transaction – can be posted on the day of the transaction. This criterion may be questionable, 
in particular, if applied to structured products such as Level 3 assets, whose valuation is difficult 
and discretionary. In this case, upfront recognition of profits constitutes a powerful incentive to 
create these products, in order to sell them at a higher price than resulting from the valuation model. 
In the hands of managers with short-term incentives (see Section 5), this mechanism can be a 
powerful cause of pro-cyclicality. However, the recognition of day-one profit as income was 
possible in some countries even before the introduction of IAS/IFRS; actually IAS 39, if anything, 
made this practice more difficult, by allowing it only under specific conditions.
140 As a 
consequence, the transition to IAS/IFRS generally brought – other things equal – a decline of day-
one profits, in particular for investment banks.
141 In general, day-one booking of profits was 






Box. Cost Accounting vs. Fair Value Accounting 
Diffusion of FVA – The share of assets and liabilities valued at fair value varies greatly across 
countries (Fig. 4.1, Panel A). It is higher in banking systems such as Switzerland, France, the U.S. 
and the U.K., dominated by very large institutions that engage heavily in sophisticated financial 
strategies (or used to), and lower in countries such as Italy and Spain where banks are more focused 
on traditional credit activity. The composition of fair valued assets also varies: the share of the 
trading and derivatives portfolio that directly affects the profit and loss statement is above 75% in 
Switzerland, the U.K. and France; the share of assets available for sale, whose changes in valuation 
affects only the balance sheet, is highest in Luxembourg and Spain (Fig. 4.1, Panel B). In terms of 
valuation, international differences are not great: Level 1 assets comprise around 25% of banks’ 
portfolios and Level 2 assets 70%. Level 3 assets, the most opaque, account for the rest (Fig. 4.1, 
Panel C); while this part is relatively small, there is evidence that it may have 
                                                 
140  Day-one booking is allowed only if the valuation is supported by the price of current market transactions in the same 
instrument or is based on the use of a valuation technique whose variables include only observable market data.  
141  In the case of Société Générale, for instance, the changed treatment of day-one profits caused by the transition to 
IAS/IFRS reduced shareholder’s equity by €574 million (on the basis of French accounting principles, day-one 
profits had been booked immediately through profit and loss on the trade date; see annual report 2005).    53
Figure 4.1
Panel A: Share of Bank Assets and Liabilities Valued at Fair Value 
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Panel B: Composition of Bank Fair Value Assets 
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grown considerably of late.
1 The share of total assets that is marked to market is not exceedingly 
high, although aggregate data conceal the fact that for systemically relevant institutions the weight 
of fair valued assets is typically higher. But when marked-to-market assets are compared with bank 
capital, the picture is more worrisome: if equity is around 5% of total assets and fair valued assets 
are 50% of the total, then a drop of 10% in asset value would totally wipe out a banks' capital. 
Historical Cost Accounting vs. Fair Value Accounting – The relative pros and cons of fair value and 
historical cost accounting (HCA) for financial institutions have been widely debated (see Taylor 
and Goodhart (2004) for a list of references). A consensus seems to have emerged that FVA 
provides more timely information and helps improve transparency, although it adds excess 
volatility.
2 
According to Plantin et al. (2008a,b) “The historical cost regime is inefficient because it 
ignores price signals. However, in trying to extract the informational content of current prices, the 
mark-to-market regime distorts this content by adding an extra, non-fundamental component to 
price fluctuations. As a result, the choice between these measurement regimes boils down to a 
dilemma between ignoring price signals, or relying on their degraded versions” (p. 92).
3 They also 
argue that HCA has a countercyclical effect, because when the market price rises above its 
historical cost value, the manager (possibly affected by short-termism) has an incentive to sell it to 
boost current profits, and vice-versa. While likely sub-optimal in terms of efficiency, this 
mechanism is clearly countercyclical. 
The pros and cons of FVA and HCA have been examined by several authors using recent 
historical examples (see Banque de France, 2008). Just as the current crisis has highlighted the 
shortcomings of FVA, the U.S. savings and loan crisis and Japan’s lost decade clearly revealed the 
inadequacy of historical cost accounting and prompted the move to FVA. By allowing banks to 
postpone the booking of losses on loans to insolvent companies, HCA may have delayed effective 
action against these crises for years and vastly increased the cost of salvaging the financial industry 
and restarting the economy.
4 
Allen and Carletti (2008c) present a good summary of the prevailing view. They argue that, 
due to market imperfections, mark-to-market may lead to balance-sheet changes not justified by 
fundamentals. HCA largely avoids these problems, but is inferior to mark-to-market when price 
changes do reflect fundamentals. In their view, the key market imperfection is potentially 
insufficient liquidity.
5 Thus, the debate centres on whether liquidity factors, and not other 
fundamentals, are the key determinants of market prices. The conclusion is that each system works 
better in some cases and worse in others. 
Departing somewhat from this consensus, we argue here that in effect HCA is strictly 
dominated by some form of FVA under all circumstances. Consider, for simplicity, two 
instruments, one with high price volatility around a constant mean, the other with low price 
volatility around a trend (and hence with a mean value that increases over time). Clearly point-in-
time FVA (mark-to-market) is the optimal accounting representation method for the second 
instrument, as HCA would fail to capture the price increase, and would become obsolete more or 
less rapidly depending on the strength of the trend. Point-in-time FVA will be inadequate for the 
first (constant-mean) asset, because the frequent snapshots would give an incorrect, over-volatile 
representation of the true underlying value. The proper representation for such instrument would not 
be historical cost accounting but instead a time series average of point-in-time FVA, because a 
sample mean would clearly dominate an individual realization.
6 This reasoning is summarized in 
the following table:  
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Table 4.2: Fair value accounting and instrument characteristics 




Best suited for instruments characterized by:  
Point in time    Maximum    Minimum    Trending value, low short-term volatility  
Average    Minimum    Maximum    Stationary value, high short-term volatility  
 
 
Indeed, proposals to average FVA values have been made recently (see e.g. Plantin et al. 
2008a, JPMorgan, 2008). In practice, HCA is likely to favour intertemporal smoothing: as profits 
are booked when realized, banks can accumulate reserves in good times and deplete them in bad, 






1  Matherat (2008) argues that the crisis induced many financial institutions to switch from valuation methods based on 
observable prices or deemed to be observable (indices) to model-based valuations. This is in line with Clerc (2008), 
who reports estimates by Goldman Sachs suggesting that the share of Level 3 assets had increased substantially in the 
first quarter of 2008. 
2 Note that for financial derivatives FVA is the only possible valuation method, as valuation at cost would make no 
sense. Hodder et al. (2007) simulate the volatility of net income under full fair value (i.e. with all assets and liabilities 
priced at fair value) and compare it with income volatility measures drawn from market data. They conclude that full 
fair value income volatility captures some risk that is not reflected in traditional measures of income volatility. This is 
consistent with FV being a better representation of underlying variables than other accounting methods, but it 
neglects the possibility that in some cases it is precisely marking to market (combined with capital regulation) that 
generates market volatility, i.e. fair value volatility might not merely proxy market volatility but actually cause it. 
3  Their model yields the following results, summarized in Plantin et al. (2008a): (i) for sufficiently short-lived assets, 
marking-to-market induces less inefficiencies than HCA. The converse is true for long-lived assets; (ii) for liquid 
assets, marking-to-market induces less inefficiencies than HCA. The converse is true for illiquid assets; (iii) for 
sufficiently junior assets, marking-to-market induces less inefficiencies than HCA. The converse is true for senior 
assets. In the authors’ view, these results may explain why the opposition to marking-to-market was led by banks and 
insurance companies, while investors in equity markets were among its most enthusiastic proponents. 
4   See Michael (2004) and Jackson and Lodge (2000) for the role of HCA in the U.S. S&L crisis. Allen and Carletti   
(2008c) argue that the LTCM crisis in 1998 was also due to the malfunctioning of market prices, which was why the   
Federal Reserve Bank of New York became actively involved. 
5    See Allen and Carletti (2008a, 2008b) and Allen and Gale (2007). 
6    In principle, the asset value could be computed via a standard filtering approach (Kalman filter). 
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4.3 Corrective actions  
A consensus is building that although the causes of the crisis do not lie in accounting 
standards,
142 FVA may have magnified certain passages.
143 In reaction to the latest developments 
and to the recommendations of the Financial Stability Forum (2008), the IASB and the FASB have 
provided guidance and amendments to their accounting standards (e.g. reclassification of financial 
instruments) and planned measures to improve their quality in the medium term. The return to cost 
accounting is not being considered, as it would decrease the transparency of financial statements, 
against the requests of investors and risk managers.  
While a thorough review of the ongoing work in this field is outside the scope of this essay, 
we do now discuss the key areas for improvement, focusing on those of particular importance for 
pro-cyclicality.  
Banks’ discretionality should be reduced –  The excessive complexity and ambiguity of some 
accounting rules opened the door to divergent interpretations and opportunistic behaviour. The 
IASB and the FASB have now issued several clarifications of some of the concepts discussed in 
Section 4.1; they have stressed that fair value cannot be represented by the price of a forced 
liquidation or distress sale.
144  
A prominent factor of discretionality is valuation according to holding intention: a given 
instrument must be marked to market if it is to be sold in the near term, but can be valued at cost if 
the intention is to keep it to maturity. After the initial decision, the accounting treatment of 
instruments can be changed only under exceptional circumstances. Some commentators (JPMorgan, 
2008) have questioned this mechanism, which seems too flexible initially and too rigid afterwards, 
when intent might have changed in good faith due to changing circumstances. A return to valuation 
principles based on the nature of financial instruments rather than the holder’s intent has been 
proposed to reduce discretion.
145  However, this change would sever the link between valuation and 
the role of assets/liabilities in the balance sheet, which was a key motivation for the adoption of the 
new accounting standards. Furthermore, for complex financial instruments, whose nature is difficult 
to assess, discretionality could not be entirely eliminated.  
  Valuation of illiquid/complex financial instruments is one of the most difficult areas, and 
one in which progress is needed. On the one hand, convergence on methods and models would 
appear to be essential, as the differences among market participants was one of the main causes of 
the current market freeze.
146 On the other hand, such convergence may be hard to achieve, 
considering that good proprietary models are typically part of a bank’s competitive edge.
147  
Transparency and disclosure should be enhanced – Where discretionality cannot be eliminated, a 
second-best solution could be enhanced transparency and disclosure. Following the recognition that 
                                                 
142  According to SEC (2008), the vast majority of the assets of U.S. banks that failed consisted in loans booked at 
amortized cost; fair value losses had no significant impact on their capital. 
143  See Noyer (2008).  
144    See, for example, FASB (2009), which provides additional guidance on determining whether a market for a 
financial asset is active and a transaction is distressed. 
145  Brunnermeier  et al. (2009) propose an intermediate system – the “mark-to-funding” approach – to deal with 
liquidity mismatches during a crisis. The idea is that assets should be valued and managed “…not according to the 
intention of the holder or the short-term vagaries of the market, but according to the capacity of the holder. Capacity 
to hold on to assets is driven by the maturity of the funding of the assets.”  
146  See Banziger (2008) 
147  See Clerc (2008).   57
an informational breakdown was a powerful amplifier of the recent crisis, a consensus has emerged 
that further enhancement of transparency is essential. The main organizations (Basel Committee, 
FSF, CEBS, accounting bodies) are working on proposals.
148 For instance, firms could be required 
to include a specific, standardized note in financial statements and interim reports providing 
information on the performance and volatility of complex or, more generally, illiquid financial 
instruments. Additional disclosures could be also required about the sensitivity of Level 3 fair value 
estimates to key model assumptions.
149 Auditors could be required to assess compliance on these 
issues.
150 
Excessive recourse to FVA should be prevented – At least two ways to avoid excessive recourse to 
fair value could be considered: 
−  the HFT portfolio could be restricted exclusively to securities effectively held for trading 
purposes, in whose regard evaluation at market price and accounting for accrued but unrealized 
gains or losses entails no special risk (since they will quickly become realized profits or losses 
anyway). For example, a minimum turnover rate/maximum holding period could be set. Assets 
failing to meet these more stringent criteria could be included in the AFS portfolio. This would 
attenuate pro-cyclicality of balance sheets, as banks would not be forced to record unrealized 
gains and losses in the income statement; furthermore, in expansionary periods the AFS reserve 
mechanism described in Section 4.1 would cause an accumulation of funds that could help 
weather difficult times (see also below).
151 
−  uniform accounting treatment of fair value hedges, together with a simplification of hedge 
accounting requirements, could be introduced. All hedged items could be included in the same 
portfolio, whether or not the hedge is “highly effective”, thus avoiding accounting asymmetries 
and an unnecessary increase in assets/liabilities valued at FV (see Section 4.1). This would 
attenuate income volatility and ensure that instruments that are matched economically are 
matched on the books as well. Of course, if a hedge is ineffective or introduces new risks (e.g. a 
cash flow risk due to margins on the derivative product) this should be clearly signalled as 
additional information (i.e. outstanding amounts, results, etc.).   
Accounting rules should allow for prudential reserves – The broad consensus that risks materialize 
in downturns but tend to build up undetected during expansions (Borio et al., 2001) has engendered 
proposals for reintroducing some kind of forward-looking provisions and reserves, which should 
work as automatic stabilizers and reduce pro-cyclicality. The tension between regulators and 
accountants on this issue could be addressed, for example, via the credit value adjustments (CVA) 
approach discussed in Section 3.4.1. In addition to CVA, the following changes in supervisory 
regulation could be considered:  
−  valuation adjustments could be introduced for marked-to-model products and illiquid 
instruments in general. The related reserves would recognize the uncertainty associated with the 
calculation of fair value for complex or illiquid products, giving a more reliable measurement of 
value than direct application of a point estimate of its fair value (see Viñals, 2008). These 
                                                 
148  See, for example, IASB ( 2009, 2008a). 
149  See Ryan (2008). 
150  Bolder proposals have also been made. Viñals (2008) and Clerc (2008) suggest adjusting fair value estimates to 
account for model, input, data or parameter uncertainty, or introducing these concepts into prudential regulation. 
Caruana and Pazarbasioglu (2008) argue that fair value should use not only the latest transaction price but also 
information on volatility and cyclical behaviour, as well as management’s forecast of asset price progression. These 
proposals, appealing as they may be, raise problems of implementability and increased discretion. 
151 No relevant information on company performance would be lost, as the instruments would be aligned to current 
values and the changes in fair value would be reported in the notes (movements of AFS reserves).   58
reserves would not appear formally in the accounts but would count towards reducing 
regulatory capital and could be subjected to disclosure requirements;  
−  high initial valuation adjustments could be introduced for new or recently introduced 
instruments, declining gradually as information improves (e.g. the valuation adjustments could 
be eased when an instrument moves from OTC to a regulated market); 
−  the impact of the AFS reserves (discussed in section 4.1) on supervisory capital could be 
entirely eliminated.
152 
Risks need to be addressed more explicitly – It is now evident that in the run-up to the present crisis 
certain risks, first and foremost liquidity risk, were underestimated by market prices and mark-to-
model approaches and had been fictitiously recorded as profits in previous years. To address this 
issue, mechanisms similar to the CVA approach discussed for loans in Section 3.4.1 could be 
flanked by alternative measures. The FASB and IASB are working to improve the guidance about 
valuation methodologies for illiquid assets, relying on risk-adjusted expected cash-flows.
153 During 
a crisis, however, adjusting for liquidity risk might drive prices down towards “distressed” levels.
154 
To avoid this, liquidity risk premia estimates could take account of the holding period and the 
bank’s ability to keep each instrument. The recent crisis has shown that this capacity depends on 
whether funding liquidity is short-term or long-term, an aspect that accountants and regulators alike 
have overlooked.
155  
Should the share of liabilities valued at FV be increased? – As noted, most of the liabilities side is 
being carried at cost today, although IAS/IFRS leaves intermediaries ample scope for choice. 
JPMorgan (2008) argues that FVA should be fully applied to liabilities as well. This would clearly 
reduce pro-cyclicality, but it is controversial: paradoxically, a deterioration in the company’s credit 
rating would reduce the fair value of its liabilities and thus increase profits.
156 JPMorgan (2008) 
argues that this paradox could be handled by providing for full transparency of the effects in the 
accounts, leaving analysts free to assess the situation; furthermore, application of FV could be 
limited to actively traded liabilities. The proposal remains nonetheless highly controversial.  
A minimum annual amortization of goodwill could be reintroduced – This would mitigate the 
negative impact of impairment when economic conditions turn adverse (impairment losses would 
be partially offset by the portion of goodwill that has already been amortized).
157  
                                                 
152  Under the current regulation (drafted at the national level based on the recommendations of the Basel Committee 
and CEBS) the AFS reserves affect supervisory capital as follows: (i) reserves vis-à-vis loans and receivables are 
completely sterilized (they do not affect regulatory capital); (ii) for reserves vis-à-vis equity securities, an 
asymmetrical filter is applied: an increase in reserves concurs only partially to increase regulatory capital, whereas a 
decrease fully concurs to decrease it; (iii) for reserves vis-à-vis debt securities, banks can choose from either option 
(i) or (ii). Our proposal would reduce pro-cyclicality because it would completely eliminate the impact of AFS 
reserves on regulatory capital. 
153  See IASB (2008b, 2008c). 
154  This point is raised by the SEC (2008). 
155  Persaud (2008) argues that the total failure at the regulatory and accounting level to distinguish between agents with 
short-term funding (the first to run into trouble in a crisis) and those with long-term funding (the system stabilizers) 
contributed to the disproportionate growth of the former, and hence to the outbreak of the crisis.  
156  A quantification of the effect of application of full FVA to the liabilities side, and a discussion of the objections of 
this option is in IMF (2008b). 
157  The importance of this issue will show up in the balance sheets for 2008; for instance, Royal Bank of Scotland has 
announced large impairment losses on goodwill.   59
Enforcement needs to be improved – In the initial phase, controls on the application of the new 
IAS/IFRS standards may not always have been effective, in part owing to the excessive complexity 
and murkiness of some standards. The enforcement of accounting rules should therefore be 
tightened, as by assigning specific responsibilities to audit firms. To this end, it will be necessary to 
reinforce the coordination between supervisors, auditing firms and the accounting bodies.  
It is also worth discussing some of the pro-cyclical factors recalled in Section 4.2 that pre-
date the move to FVA but whose effects can be mitigated via appropriate amendments.  
Consolidation and derecognition rules should be improved
158 – The treatment of off-balance-sheet 
assets may have major impact on pro-cyclicality through its effect on leverage, which we discussed 
in Section 3. Consolidation and derecognition are intertwined, as derecognition of assets sometimes 
involves the use of structured entities. The crisis has shown that the treatment of special purpose 
entities may be crucial in assessing a bank’s risk exposure and resilience.
159 We have argued that 
the expansion of off-balance-sheet assets cannot be blamed on FVA, but it is clear that the way 
these assets are treated is decisive in assessing leverage, and hence in pro-cyclicality. Both IASB
160 
and FASB have moved promptly to address the issue.  
The IASB, in particular, in the proposed new standard on consolidation focuses: (i) on the 
introduction of a unique definition of control, to address perceived inconsistencies within current 
regulation between IAS 27 (which focuses on control) and SIC 12 (which focuses on risks and 
rewards and is referred to special purpose vehicles);
161 (ii) on enhancement of disclosure about 
consolidated and non-consolidated entities. Critics of this proposal maintain that the lack of clarity 
in the definition of control and the abandonment of the risk and rewards approach could determine a 
reduction of the consolidation area, compared to that resulting from the current rules.  
The treatment of day-one profits could be reconsidered – As discussed in the previous section, the 
pro-cyclicality induced by the treatment of day-one profits cannot be attributed to FVA. However, 
the IASB is working on a proposal to reintroduce upfront recognition of profits also when prices are 
computed with the help of unobservable inputs, e.g. Level 3 assets.
162 However, the new approach – 
possibly motivated by harmonization needs (it would be similar to U.S. SFAS 157) – could 
heighten the incentive to create products or transactions that allow such upfront recognition. 
Moreover, both the absence of observable input and the greater discretion involved in marking to 
model could induce an underestimation of the risks. A possible solution to this incentive problem 
would be amortization of day-one profits over the term of the instruments. 
Convergence in accounting rules should be speeded up – While similar in many respects, the two 
main accounting systems (GAAP for the U.S. and IAS/IFRS for the rest of the world) still have 
non-trivial differences. Convergence on truly global accounting standards should be speeded up, to 
ease comparisons and transparency and avoid regulatory arbitrage.
163 Although GAAP and 
                                                 
158  Derecognition is the removal of a financial asset from the balance sheet (e.g. through a sale in which the entity 
transfers to another party all of the significant risks and rewards). 
159  Financial Stability Forum (2008) highlighted “the need for clarity about the treatment of off-balance sheet entities 
and about the risks they pose to financial institutions”. 
160  See IASB (2008d), according to which “a reporting entity controls another entity when the reporting entity has the 
power to direct the activities of that other entity to generate returns for the reporting entity”. 
161    SIC 12 is an Interpretation of the accounting rules on consolidation, provided by the Standing Interpretations 
Committee of the IASB. 
162  See, in particular, IASB (2008e). 
163  In February 2006, FASB and IASB signed a Memorandum of Understanding for progressive convergence of 
accounting standards. The market turmoil has accelerated this process. On 27 August 2008, the Securities and     60
IAS/IFRS have similar requirements for financial instruments, they are still characterized by 
different approaches (the GAAP is more rule-based, the IFRS is more principle-based) that 
sometimes lead to divergent accounting treatment of the same transaction. One example is the 
treatment of day-one profits, just mentioned. Another example is the different approach to off-
balance sheet arrangements: according to some commentators (JPMorgan, 2008) reliance by the 
IFRS on qualitative rather than quantitative tests for control compared to GAAP has been more 
effective at ensuring the consolidation of special purpose entities.




                                                                                                                                                                  
Exchange Commission endorsed a road map that could lead to the use of IAS/IFRS by U.S. issuers beginning in 
2014 (and in 2009 for about 110 top companies). 
164 See also SEC roundtable on the performance of IFRS during the market turmoil (August 2008; 
www.connectlive.com/events/secroundtable080408). During the roundtable, Deutsche Bank noted that upon 
conversion from GAAP to IFRS the group was required to consolidate many more special purpose vehicles, due to 
the different treatment of Qualified Special Purpose Entities (QSPE) that GAAP rules would allow not to 
consolidate. The conditions necessary for a SPE to qualify as a QSPE are defined in paragraph 35 of FAS 140. 
Notice however that in the proposed new standard on consolidation (see FAS 140 exposure draft) enterprises 
involved with qualified special purpose entities would no longer be exempted  from consolidation.    61
5. MANAGERS’ INCENTIVES 
The principal-agent problems stemming from the inevitable conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers require incentives to align the divergent motivations. The traditional 
view is that managers are naturally risk-averse and so need an incentive to undertake risky but 
profitable projects for the firm. Bonuses, options and restricted stocks are therefore typically 
included in the executive compensation structure to overcome risk aversion and heighten managers’ 
willingness to bear risk.
165 These instruments are also used by companies to retain highly talented 
managers; in this case stock options, golden parachutes and very large bonuses play the role of 
“golden handcuffs”: they work as monetary disincentives for valuable employees to leave.
166 
The current financial crisis has shown instead that managers of financial institutions may take 
risks that are excessive in relation to the interests of other stakeholders (small shareholders, banks’ 
counterparties and the society at large).
167 In this section we discuss how this may be partly due to 
the incentive structure incorporated in remuneration schemes, which may encourage them to attach 
too much importance to short-term gains and correspondingly to underweight the risks and potential 
future losses. All in all, this accentuates the degree of pro-cyclicality of the financial system.  
We first look at the compensation schemes of the managers of financial institutions (banks, 
investment funds, hedge funds). We then discuss the relationship between incentives and pro-
cyclicality and examine the evidence. Finally, we review the solutions now under consideration 
within the financial industry and among regulators.    
5.1 Incentives in the structure of managers’ remuneration  
Executive pay packages often consist of a base salary, resulting from a combination of position 
requirements and ability (termed “pay-for-the-job” and “pay-for-the-person” schemes in the 
literature), plus a variable performance-based component, which may involve annual cash bonuses, 
stock options and other long-term incentives (restricted stock plans).
168 To ensure that managers 
look after the interests of shareholders, the variable component (bonus plans, stock options) is 
generally linked to profits, but such plans can induce managers to take excessive risk, to increase 
current at the expense of future profitability and, more generally, to undertake actions that may not 
be in the shareholders’ interests. Several interrelated mechanisms have been highlighted:  
(i)  Short-termism – Remuneration schemes based on short-term performance are common. 
Typically, the gauge of performance is accounting profit, which is inherently backward-looking, 
short-run, and to some extent subject to manipulation by the managers themselves. Such schemes 
may prompt executives to take excessive risk and to overlook inefficiencies and long-term 
underperformance in order to boost immediate results.
169 For example, in good times bank managers 
may opt for lax lending standards in order to artificially inflate short-term profits, despite the 
potential drain on future profits (see below). In a similar vein, especially when volatility is high, the 
                                                 
165  See Haugen and Senbet (1981), De Fusco et al. (1990), Guay (1999).   
166  See Cappelli (2000). 
167  See Becker (2008). 
168  See Murphy (1999), Lemieux et al. (2008). 
169   Incentives for managers to smooth the reported income stream have also been observed (see Healy (1985) and 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). These clearly reduce pro-cyclicality but do not appear to have been predominant in the 
financial sector over the last decade.    62
managers of mutual funds or hedge funds may achieve some sub-periods (quarters, say) with 
positive returns even when the return for an entire year is negative. If managers are rewarded when 
they make profits but don’t have to pay back when they underperform (see mechanism (ii)), they 
have an incentive to increase the risk of the portfolio (credit risk, return volatility, etc.).  
(ii)  Discontinuity, asymmetry of incentives – The structure of bonuses and stock options is 
discontinuous and asymmetrical. Bonuses are typically awarded if some threshold performance is 
achieved, and stock options are exercised if they are in the money; but if the performance is negative 
or the stock price declines, the manager owes nothing to the firm. This produces a powerful 
incentive to take risk in order to reach the threshold (say, by advocating projects with low or even 
negative net present value and a high risk profile that the manager would not have considered save 
for the discontinuity; see mechanism (vi)).  
(iii)  Fake alpha
170 – As the financial crisis has revealed, bonuses are often paid based on deals that 
entail large immediate gains but also large risks. However, these risks were largely overlooked, as 
managers generated income that appeared to stem from their superior abilities but was actually just a 
market risk premium.
171 Even though the bank had risk managers whose job is to contrast this 
tendency, risks were overlooked for at least two reasons. First, ex ante, risk remuneration is hard to 
disentangle from true “alpha”, so that accurate assessment often doesn’t come until after the risks 
have materialized as actual losses; this is especially true for tail risk – risk related to events that are 
rare or hard to foresee (see below). Second, top managers are themselves partly remunerated on the 
basis of short-term earnings through bonuses and stock options (to the extent that high short-term 
earnings help boost stock prices), so they may also have incentives to overrule risk managers.
172 
(iv)  Unintended consequences of incentive schemes – A relatively new empirical literature suggests 
that incentive schemes may have unintended consequences that are detrimental to shareholders: 
managers may persuade the executive compensation committee to award them options in advance of 
favourable earnings announcements;
173 they can use hedging instruments to reduce the risk 
associated with their ownership stake in the firm if they foresee stock price volatility;
174 they may 
deliberately distort financial statements, or even misreport.
175 Finally, there is evidence that 
incentives may interact with governance structure to produce suboptimal results.
176  
                                                 
170  According to the CAPM model, returns reflect systematic risk (beta risk) and the value that the manager’s ability 
contributes to the investment process (alpha). See e.g. Rajan (2005). 
171  The Shareholder Report on UBS Writedowns says: “The CDO desk received structuring fees on the notional value of 
the deal, and focused on Mezzanine (“Mezz”) CDOs, which generated fees of approximately 125 to 150 bp 
(compared with high-grade CDOs, which generated fees of approximately 30 to 50 bp).” (p. 13). The greater fee 
income from riskier, lower quality mortgages fed directly to the originating unit’s bottom line, even though this fee 
income was, at least in part, compensation for the greater risk of being stuck with unsold securities if market 
conditions turned (as reported in Kashyap et al., 2008). 
172  A risk manager at one large global bank reported: “Traders saw us as obstructive and a hindrance to their ability to 
earn higher bonuses…..Most of the time the business line would simply not take no for an answer, especially if the 
profits were big enough.” (The Economist, 7 August 2008). Similarly, a recent review of risk management practices 
by financial institutions reports “At most firms, risk managers are not viewed as ‘profit centers’, so they lack the 
clout of the money-makers on the trading desk. That was especially true at the tail end of the bubble, when firms 
were grabbling for every last penny of profit” (see the article by J. Nocera, New York Times, 4 January 2009).   
173  See Yermack (1997). Similarly, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) suggest that executives may manage the timing of their 
disclosures opportunistically (delaying the announcement of good news and rushing bad news forward) so as to 
maximize the value of their stock options.  
174  See Bettis et al. (2001), for the thesis that risk-averse managers are more likely to diversify their holdings as their 
wealth in the firm increases and when they are exposed to increased volatility.  
175   See Burns and Kedia (2006, 2008). Efendi et al. (2007) find that the likelihood of a false financial statement is 
significantly greater when the CEO has very sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. Benmelech et al. (2008)   63
(v)  Large incentives may induce fraud – Recent evidence supports the economic theory of crime 
proposed by Becker (1968), revealing that executives are more likely to engage in fraudulent 
behaviour when the payoff is greater. In particular, the likelihood of corporate fraud has been found 
to be positively related to incentives from unrestricted stockholdings, whereas it is not correlated 
with incentives from restricted stock and unvested and vested options.
177 Moreover, unrestricted 
stockholdings are the main form of managerial incentive in the firms under SEC investigation for 
fraud, whereas in the control group of firms the main form is vested options.  
(vi)  Drawbacks of stock options – Since stock options turn paid managers into part-owners, they 
should mitigate incentive problems, but the incentives produced by stock options don’t mimic those 
of straight stock ownership. For one thing, the value of the option increases with the volatility of the 
company’s stock. Thus, option-loaded CEOs have an incentive to go for risky projects and to 
disregard early signs of failure.
178 Second, they have an incentive for buy-backs in order to boost 
stock prices, whether or not this maximizes the long-term value of the company. 
(vii)  The golden parachute trade-off – The original motivation for the “golden parachute” was to 
give managers the incentive to maximize the value of the firm by sheltering them from worry over 
losing their job if control changed hands. But the scheme may also create a perverse incentive to 
drive the stock price down and make the firm an attractive takeover target, especially in the case of 
poorly performing firms that require substantial turnaround effort. 
(viii) Incentives specific to asset managers – The remuneration of asset managers is characterized by 
industry-specific incentives, in addition to those just seen. First, payoffs are directly related to 
performance through incentive fees. Hedge fund managers, for example, usually receive 20% of the 
fund’s excess return over a given benchmark. This incentive fee may induce managers to make risky 
investments for high returns. Second, fund managers’ remuneration is also linked to performance 
indirectly, in that it depends on total assets under management.
179 Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show 
that young investment funds tend to have the convex flow-performance relationship graphed in 
Figure 5.1: investors quickly move their money into funds that have been successful in the recent 
past, but are slow to disinvest in poorly performing funds. As a result managers are likely to 
concentrate on the upside and overlook downside risks, as the materialization of the former boosts 
inflows strongly and the latter increase outflows only mildly.
180 Finally, fund performance is often 
gauged in relative terms, against an industry benchmark. This can create two perverse incentives:
181 
(a) underperforming managers may try to catch up by taking additional risks that are not in their 
                                                                                                                                                                  
study the trade-off, typical of a non-linear compensation scheme, between managers’ effort and truth-telling 
behaviour. 
176  Core et al. (1999) argue that firms with weaker governance have greater agency problems; that CEOs at firms with 
greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with greater agency problems perform worse. 
177  See Johnson et al. (2009). Bruner et al. (2005) find that equity compensation increases effort but also managerial 
fraud. Vesting mechanisms allow employees to acquire incentives only gradually, over time. For instance, a typical 
vesting mechanism may envision a 25% “cliff “ at the end of the first year, and monthly vesting of the remaining 
75% over the following 3 years. That is, the employee gets nothing if he leaves the company before a year, 37.5% of 
the benefits (stocks, options) if he leaves after 18 months, and so on. Various vesting schedules (frontloaded, 
backloaded, etc.) can be used to attune the incentive to stay with the company. 
178  See Sanders and Hambrick (2007). 
179  Hedge fund managers, for example, are typically paid a fixed fee of 2% of the assets under management. 
180  The figure suggests that at extreme positions these incentives may reverse: managers well behind the market may 
want to reduce their risk in order to avoid large outflows, whereas those well ahead of the market may have a strong 
incentive to gamble in an attempt to qualify as “top performers” of the year.  
181  See Rajan (2005).   64
benchmark and are hidden from investors;
182 (b) managers may be tempted to herd with other 
managers in order to be sure that they will not underperform their peers.
183 In periods of rising prices 
these two incentives may reinforce each other and make the system pro-cyclical, moving asset prices 





1 Flow-performance relationship for young funds (2 years) with 90 per cent confidence bar.
Source: Chevalier and Ellison (1997). 








Box. Recent trends in bank executives’ compensation  
During the deregulation period of the nineties, as banks tilted their product mix toward fee-
based income and away from traditional lending business, the average pay level for the CEOs of 
U.S. banks increased much faster than nominal GDP.
1 This increase reflects the variable, incentive-
related component of the compensation, while the fixed component (the salary) remained 
unchanged (fig. 5.2).
2 
                                                 
182  For example, a fund manager who buys AAA-rated tranches of CDOs gains excess returns over similar AAA-rated 
bonds, but that return is in reality remunerating the default risk and liquidity risk of the CDO. The high rating allows 
the manager to create a fake alpha, obtaining excess return with no apparent additional risk.  
183  Kashyap et al. (2008) quote Citigroup Chairman Chuck Prince describing why his bank continued financing buyouts 
despite mounting risks: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the 
music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing”.   65
Figure 5.2
Source: John and Qian (2003). 




The reasons for this surge are still open to debate. One view is that the use of stock options 
and other non-cash compensation schemes was fostered by fiscal and accounting rules aimed at 
curbing top executives compensation. In particular, in 1993 the U.S. Congress passed the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act, which defined non-performance related compensation of managers in 
excess of $1 million “unreasonable” and therefore not deductible for corporate income tax 
purposes. Jensen and Murphy (2004) point out that although the objective of the new regulation 
was to curb “excessive” CEO pay levels, the ultimate outcome was a significant increase in 
executive compensation. In fact, as soon as the Act introduced the $1 million threshold, many 
companies increased cash compensation to that threshold and began to add option grants that de 
facto restored the tax deductibility of pay in excess of $1 million. Jensen and Murphy (2004) also 
report that the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, whereby the U.S. government imposed a special 
excise tax on payments exceeding three times the executive’s average remuneration, had similar 
unintended effects. The Act was meant to reduce the generosity of parachute payments, but 
apparently it spurred adoption in many companies that had not heretofore used them.  
Accounting rules have also played a role in fostering the increase in managers’ compensation.
In the U.S., until 2006 option grants were not expensed in the firms’ income statement: since stock 
option compensation expense was based on the “intrinsic value method” at the grant date, by 
issuing stock options to employees with strike prices equal to current market prices no 
compensation expense was recognized.
3  
A different view suggests that the great increase in the relative compensations in the financial 
sector over the past 20 years was due mainly to deregulation and the resulting increase in 
competition. Philippon and Reshef (2009) find that deregulation accounts for 83% of changes in the 
relative compensation of the U.S. financial sector (with respect to the rest of the non-farm private 
sector) from 1909 to 2006. In a similar vein, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009) argue that deregulation 
and increased competition in the nineties triggered an increase in the variable component of pay 
(whereas the fixed component fell). 
There is now a rapidly growing consensus that compensations in the financial sector have   66
become excessive. A measure of excess compensation in the financial sector computed by 
Philippon and Reshef (2009) shows that current compensation levels are even higher than those last 
seen during the Great depression (Figure 5.3). Analogously, figure 5.2 loosely suggests that, at least 
in the banking industry, the connection between performance and top managers’ compensation is 
weak at best.  
Figure 5.3
Excess compensation in the financial sector 
 
 
Source: Philippon and Reshef (2009). The figure reports the relative (excess) wage of the  
U.S. financial sector (with respect to the non-farm private sector).  
 
The recent crisis corroborates the evidence of excessive compensation levels and weak 
relationship between pay and performance in the financial sector. In 2007 Wall Street bonuses 
declined by just 2%, to a total of $33.2 billion, even though the crisis battered profits.
4 The decline 
in 2008 was sharper, 44%, but it still left total bonuses well above $18 billion, at a time in which 




1   See Brewer III et al. (2003, 2004), Philippon and Reshef (2009).       
2   See John and Qian (2003), Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009).  
3   In 1995 attempts by the Financial Accounting Standard Board to require firms to measure option value based upon 
the “fair value method” were rejected by the U.S. Congress; the FASB managed nevertheless to make firms 
disclose in the notes of their financial statements what stock-option expenses would have been according to the 
Black-Scholes or binomial option pricing methods. The issue of expensing stock-options returned to the front 
burner in mid-2002 with the Enron collapse. In December 2004 the FASB released Statement n. 123 (Revisited) 
Share-Based Payment, requiring public and non public companies to report stock-based compensation in their 
income statement starting in 2006. 
4   See New York State Comptroller’s Office news releases (2008). This behaviour, possibly driven by the fear of 
losing high-performing employees, may have been modified lately. For example, some CEOs of top European and 
U.S. banks have recently announced their willingness to forgo their 2008 bonuses. Such announcements have been 
made, among others, by executives of Goldman Sachs, Barclays, Deutsche Bank and UBS.   
5   See New York State Comptroller’s Office news releases (2009). The decline in the value of bonuses may partly 
reflect the limits on executive pay imposed by the federal Troubled Asset Relief Program.    
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5.2 Incentives and pro-cyclicality 
Do the incentive-based remuneration schemes adopted by financial firms aggravate pro-
cyclicality? While not all the mechanisms reviewed in the previous subsection are directly relevant, 
we have seen that most of them encourage risk-taking and some may induce managers to conceal 
risks. Insofar as risks are more easily taken in upturns and tend to materialize and worsen in 
downturns, the answer is that the schemes do foster financial sector pro-cyclicality. The substantial 
increases in the incentive-related component of executive compensations in recent years (see box) 
suggests that their importance for pro-cyclicality has also increased.  
Only a few studies have sought to gauge the practical relevance of incentives and their direct 
and indirect effects on pro-cyclicality, probably because of the scarcity of reliable data on executive 
compensation. Evidence of excessive short-termism (incentive (i)) has been found for the banking 
sector. Caballero et al. (2008) show that in Japan, during the 1990s banks were able to comply with 
capital requirements only by “ever-greening” loans to unprofitable firms (“zombie lending”). They 
also argue that the flow of credit to otherwise insolvent borrowers comes at the expense of profitable 
firms, which are crowded out and end up suffering from credit rationing. This observation is 
fundamental in assessing the implications for pro-cyclicality: although forbearance lending might be 
considered counter-cyclical (because it ensures funding to otherwise insolvent borrowers), it is 
precisely during a downturn (i.e. when there are many zombies around) that capital allocation 
worsens and less credit is available to good borrowers, exacerbating the initial difficulties and 
possibly triggering a credit crunch.  
Another instance of short-termism is the tendency for bank managers to charge excessively 
low lending rates and thus to underprice the put option that is implicitly granted to borrowers 
through non-recourse mortgage loans.
184 This increases the pro-cyclicality of credit: during 
expansions, excessively low rates may play a role in inflating a real estate bubble (which in turn 
sustains economic activity), but in downturns a decline in house prices will cause more defaults, 
which may impair bank capital, reduce credit supply and worsen the downturn. And in fact the 
recent evidence is that non-recourse loans played a crucial role in precipitating the current housing 
crisis. Bajari et al. (2008) find that the main driver of the recent wave of defaults in the U.S. 
subprime market was the nationwide fall in home prices. The decline in home prices caused many 
borrowers’ outstanding liability to exceed their home equity, so that default would actually increase 
their wealth.
185 In a similar vein, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) find that mortgage delinquency rates in 
the U.S. between 2000 and 2006 rose more sharply in areas that experienced larger increases in the 
number of loans originated and lending volume and were positively correlated with looser lending 
standards (low denial rates, high loan-to-income ratios). They also find that the slackening of 
lending standards coincided with other facts often associated with aggregate boom-bust credit 
cycles, such as financial innovation (securitization), increased bank competition, fast-rising house 
prices, and ample aggregate liquidity. Evidence that strong credit growth and lenient credit standards 
led loan losses is also reported by Jiménez and Saurina (2006). 
                                                 
184  Non-recourse loans are debt contracts for which the borrower is not personally liable (in case of default, the lender’s 
recovery is limited to the collateral pledged). In the U.S. non-recourse loans are typically used to finance real estate 
purchases. Effectively, these loans grant the borrower an implicit put option on the collateral: by defaulting, in 
practice the borrower sells the collateral to the bank for outstanding loan balance (in the literature this is usually 
referred to as “put option component of mortgages”; see Crawford and Rosenblatt, 1995, and Vandell, 1993). Pavlov 
et al. (2004) model the banker’s incentive to underprice the loan, observing that the incorrect valuation of the put 
option results in an inflated asset price. 
185  See also Gros (2008). According to Morgan et al. (2008), another important factor in the recent housing crisis was 
the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Reform, which helped to increase foreclosures.     68
A third example of how short-termism may impact on pro-cyclicality is provided by Jensen 
(2005). He argues that when the firm’s stock price is overvalued, managers cannot attain the 
performance needed to justify the high stock price except by pure luck. Overvalued equity therefore 
creates an incentive to do whatever it takes to keep the firm’s stock price at a high level. This 
mechanism would help to make a generalized stock market boom self-sustaining, aggravating the 
subsequent correction. 
Regarding stock options (mechanism (vi)), while the evidence that CEO option-based 
compensation increases a firm’s risk is abundant, we could not find evidence that it induces 
excessive risk-taking.
186 At the same time, from 2000 through 2007 the eight largest U.S. 
commercial and investment banks
187 repurchased a combined $174.5 billion in stocks ($27.7 billion 
in 2007). This choice seems questionable, at least in retrospect. 
Figure 5.4 
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Source: Bank of Italy calculations on HFR data. Annualized monthly standard deviation of returns over a 
12 months period, for a sample of around 6.900 hedge funds, grouped based on the level of their 
incentive fees.  
 
In the asset management industry, incentive fees are associated with better performance on a 
risk-adjusted basis, suggesting that they alleviate agency problems.
188 However, mechanism (iii) 
above illustrates the incentive to generate fake alpha and the empirical difficulty of disentangling 
fake from true alpha – i.e., of computing properly risk-adjusted returns. In fact, the evidence 
suggests that true alphas are difficult to generate.
189 This conclusion is reinforced by the recent 
                                                 
186 Cohen et al. (2000) find that stock option programs are associated with increased bank risk, but they find no 
evidence that the increase is large or damaging to shareholders. Chen et al. (2006) find that risk impacts on 
compensation and option-based wealth. Mehran and Rosenberg (2007) find that an increase in the volatility 
sensitivity of a CEO’s option portfolio (that is the change in his wealth for a given change in the standard deviation 
of stock returns) results in increased risk for the bank the following year through riskier investment decisions. 
187  Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, JP Morgan and 
Bear Stearns. See Lazonick (2008). 
188  Ackermann et al. (1999) find a positive correlation between the Sharpe ratio and incentive fees of hedge funds. For 
mutual funds Massa and Patgiri (2007) find that contractual incentives increase risk-adjusted returns. Kouwenberg 
and Ziemba (2007) find that a 20% incentive fee reduces funds’ average return and the Sharpe ratio; but for funds of 
funds, incentive fees appear to increase both risk and return, not worsening risk-adjusted returns. 
189  Fung et al. (2008) find that few funds generate positive alpha. Cesari and Panetta (2002) find that funds have no 
superior performance once management fees and other costs are taken into account. Similarly, the overperformance   69
crisis: investment strategies that were thought to generate extra-performance were in fact only 
apparent, in that returns turned negative as soon as the risks materialized. The limited empirical 
evidence appears to suggest that incentive fees are positively related to risk.
190 In fact, over the last 
eighteen years the group of hedge funds with higher incentive fees also exhibited higher volatility 
(figure 5.4).     
5.3 Proposals to reshape incentive mechanisms 
Executive incentive schemes were an important factor in preparing the way for the financial 
crisis, and this realization is generating proposals for sweeping change. The point is that 
compensation policies were designed to increase expected profits but – and this is especially true in 
the financial sector – higher returns are associated with higher risk, so high-powered incentives may 
tempt managers to go well beyond the range of acceptable risk-return combinations.  
Our review has emphasized two basic principles for compensation reform: that the parameters 
for variable remuneration should be adjusted for risk and that remuneration should be linked to long-
term profitability; the variable component should be linked to future outcomes, as in deferred 
bonuses, long-term cash incentives and restricted stock grants, claw-back clauses, and longer vesting 
horizons.
191 Regardless of the specific instrument, the key parameters are the risk-adjusted return, 
the length of the calculation horizon, and the timing of payments.
192  
In response to the pressure from government leaders who are imposing conditions for public 
support and rethinking regulation (see below), to wide media coverage of the compensation issue 
and to mounting pressure from public opinion, financial institutions have started moving in this 
direction. Several banks and banking associations have announced revisions to pay packages. For 
example, Morgan Stanley will withhold a portion of its employees’ bonuses for three years, and will 
pay them only if the performance of the investments decided by the employee turns out to be 
positive. In Europe, the French Banking Federation, following the recommendations of the Institute 
of International Finance (2008), has issued guidelines under which the variable component of 
bankers’, traders’ and fund managers’ pay will be based on net profits (taking into account all costs, 
including risk) and will be paid over many years on the basis of the profitability of the firm, not that 
of the operations of the single employee.
193  
Reforming executive remuneration is no easy task, however. First, risk adjustment methods 
are hard to apply because, as we have seen, genuine performance is hard to disentangle, ex ante, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of hedge funds may simply reflect (hidden) liquidity risk, which is hard to detect until a liquidity shock occurs. 
Gibson and Wang (2008) show that the positive risk-adjusted returns of hedge funds reflect liquidity risk premia, not 
superior managerial skills.  
190  Elton et al. (2003) show that incentive fees add convexity to the flow-performance relationship illustrated under 
point (viii), thus magnifying intertemporal risk shifting. See also Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007).  
191 See e.g. Andergassen (2008) for evidence that increasing the stock option vesting period mitigates conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders. Deferred bonuses are paid in tranches through the lifetime of the 
transaction. Long-term cash incentives are typically based on a three- to five-year performance period; most 
companies use a single performance measure (e.g. stock returns relative to an industry index). Restricted stock 
grants allow managers to acquire stocks after some time (generally three years) only if he is still with the firm and 
the firm has reached specified targets. Claw-back clauses allow the firm to reclaim part of the bonuses if ex post 
performance falls short of pre-specified targets.  
192  Several mechanisms have been proposed to implement these principles. For example, Edmans et al. (2009) suggest 
that the manager’s remuneration should be placed into an escrow account, invested in the firm’s stock and in cash. 
As the stock price changes, the account is continuously rebalanced in order to maintain the proportion invested in 
stock constant; this ensures that the manager has adequate incentives even when the stock price falls.   
193  The code will be compulsory and will apply to the 2009 bonuses of French financial firms to be paid in 2010.      70
from simple risk remuneration. Second, measures that lengthen the horizon of managers’ 
remuneration schemes mitigate short-termism but at the same time reduce the manager’s incentive 
to exert effort. That is, there is a trade-off.
194 Third, the mismatch between bonus frequency and the 
time when risks and losses materialize can be very great,
195 and managers could manipulate the risk 
profile of the bank so that large losses are unlikely during the relevant period for bonus calculation. 
Fourth, many of the firms that have failed in this crisis were in compliance with best practice 
standards in such key areas as board independence, separation of chairman and CEO positions, 
incentives and remuneration.
196 Finally, experience has shown that stricter rules on managers’ 
remuneration are prone to elusion.
197 These problems notwithstanding, mechanisms connecting 
compensation to long-term risk-adjusted firm profitability are likely to become quite widespread. 
Progress in other directions is necessary. Banks should adapt their organization to promote 
models that emphasize the importance of teamwork in well-organized structures over that of 
individual talents. This would likely improve productivity (which depends much more heavily on 
the firm’s organizational structure than on the ability of the managers)
198 and limit the excessive 
bargaining power of individual managers (clearly one of the main drivers of the high-powered 
compensation schemes).  
Banks’ governance is also crucial. The key shareholders of major banks bear heavy 
responsibility for condoning the behaviour that helped cause the financial crisis. A thorough review 
of bank governance should assess the adequacy of internal decision-making processes in several 
respects, from the mechanisms for determining managers’ remuneration schemes, in order to remove 
conflicts of interest,
199 to the role of risk managers. For example, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) propose 
that a compensation committee be set up in each firm to make informed judgments on pay levels and 
structure and ensure alignment with shareholders’ interests. A similar committee is required for 
TARP recipients by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  
Internal risk management systems must be reinforced, to reduce the danger of their position 
being overruled and to improve estimates of tail risk. In order to limit risk-taking, the first safeguard 
would be to strengthen risk management, its proficiency but also its independence and importance 
within the power hierarchy of the banks. As a general rule, traders should not be allowed to override 
risk managers, and risk managers should report directly to top management or to the board. Risk 
management should use accounting valuations and current market prices and volatilities only as a 
starting point; a wider range of factors should be taken into account to assess risk exposures; this 
highlights the role of experience and of the human factor as against the mechanical application of 
analytical models. The need for qualitative assessments is greatest in dealing with complex products, 
whose valuation is highly uncertain.  
Independent directors, powerful internal and external audits, and abundant information flows 
among all the relevant actors should all contribute to a system of checks and balances that should 
                                                 
194  Rajan (2005) argues that investors themselves may lack the incentive, or be unable, to devise adequate incentive 
schemes for managers. Moreover, measures linking bonuses to firm-wide performance could discourage managers’ 
effort; and they might appear inequitable in multi-functional firms; see Brunnermeier et al. (2009). 
195  According to Taleb (2009), it ranges from 5 to 20 years.  
196  See Berrone (2008). 
197  For instance, stock options became common after the U.S. Congress attempted to cap top executives’ remuneration 
(see box). Another example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which includes a claw-back provision (Section 304) 
for recouping compensation paid to CEOs and CFOs but it does not specify what misconduct is sufficient to trigger 
recoupment. As a result, firms have been over-restrictive in interpreting the circumstances for claw-backs and the 
executives to whom they would apply. 
198  See for example Ciapanna and Viviano (2009). Hart and Moore (1990) argue that if an agent is indispensable to an 
asset, then he should own it.  
199  For example, Montagnon (2008) notes that boards decide directors’ pay and directors sit on boards.   71
ensure internal debate about acceptable risks and mitigate their weight in financial institutions’ 
portfolios. 
But market discipline has its limits. An active role for regulators and supervisors in a matter 
such as that of remuneration, typically left to private contractual arrangements, is probably 
warranted when it comes to banks and other systemically relevant institutions, whose CEOs have 
strong incentives to invest in risky assets and, if they lose their bets, end up dumping the loss on the 
taxpayer. Regulatory policies should aim, first of all, at improving disclosure on incentives. In this 
vein, the Bank of Italy has recently issued rules requiring supervised banks to disclose detailed 
information on their compensation policy. Banks must inform shareholders of managers’ actual 
remuneration, indicating the fixed and the variable component, the breakdown between 
performance-related payments in cash or in other financial instruments, and the benefits granted to 
the manager in case of employment termination (Bank of Italy, 2008, 2009).  
Supervisors are pushing banks to carefully scrutinize the effects of compensation schemes to 
make sure they are consistent with sound risk management and with the firm's stated risk appetite 
(see FSA, 2008). They are also considering options to link capital requirements to the risks caused 
by misconceived remuneration schemes
200: the incentives for executives to assume excessive risks in 
search of short-term gains should be recognized as an explicit source of risk for the bank and taken 
into account in capital requirements. As with other proposals, the problem is that risk may be hard to 
spot in advance and that banks might invest in risks not yet fully understood and monitored 
(liquidity risk is a good example, given what has happened over the past few years). 
 Lawmakers are also focusing on executive compensation schemes and transparency. The U.S. 
Congress has approved a binding set of restrictions on executive pay, limiting bonuses to one third 
of total compensation and making them payable only in stocks that vest once the bailout funds have 
been repaid. Other countries are moving in the same direction. Some analysts argue that this could 
discourage financial firms from seeking government aid and possibly induce those that have already 
received it to repay over hastily. Moreover banks might try to get around the restrictions by boosting 
base salaries, a counterproductive effect since this component is not linked to performance. 
Nevertheless, even the critics concede that the case for such restrictions on banks whose survival 
depends on public money is very strong indeed. In any case, the restrictions need to be followed by a 
more comprehensive reform of executive remuneration to address the perverse incentives discussed 
above in the long run.  
Summing up, a very broad consensus is emerging on the need for actions to avoid excessive 
risk-taking by managers through market discipline and self-regulation on the one hand and 
regulatory and supervisory policy on the other. It is crucial, in particular, not only to modify 
compensation policies but also to strengthen the corporate governance of financial institutions. But it 
must be recognized that the trade-off between risk and efficiency cannot be eliminated. Financial 
firms will always have incentives to retain top employees, given the competition for talent, and this 
will require high-powered pay-for-performance schemes, which create incentives to exploit any 
shortcomings in internal risk measurement systems. Nevertheless, incentive policies are still a 
crucial factor for market participants and regulators in working to design a new financial framework.   
                                                 
200  See “FSA to consider bonus clampdown”, interview with Lord Adair Turner, Chairman of the UK supervisory body 
(FSA) on BBC News, 22 September 2008. See also Draghi (2008a, 2008b).   72
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